Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations in Business
Administration

College of Business (Strome)

Spring 2015

Three Essays on Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and
Development
Adam Smith
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, and the
Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, Adam. "Three Essays on Institutions, Entrepreneurship, and Development" (2015). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, ,
Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/este-ff02
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/businessadministration_etds/63

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

THREE ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND
DEVELOPMENT
By
Adam Smith
B.A. May 2005, Western Kentucky University
M. A. May 2010, Western Kentucky University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirement for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
May 2015

Approved by:

Dr. WilliarefJudi

Dr. Edward Markowski (Member)

THREE ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND
DEVELOPMENT
Adam Smith
Old Dominion University, 2015
Chair: Dr. William Judge
ABSTRACT
Each of the three essays contained in this dissertation examine the relationship
between institutions and entrepreneurship. The underlying theory that institutions shape
entrepreneurs’ outcomes is well established. However, the ways in which they do so turn
out to be quite nuanced and show marked dissimilarities where low income individuals
are involved in the entrepreneurship process. Each essay seeks to understand and identify
what contexts individuals are more likely to participate in meaningful, developmentoriented entrepreneurship. In essays I and III, the focus is on individuals at the bottom of
the economic spectrum.
Essay I links opportunity entrepreneurship to the presence of venture scripts in
subsistence economies. The absence of venture scripts (expert entrepreneurial cognitions)
helps explain why so many entrepreneurship-enabling organizations, including
microfinance organizations, fail or are ineffective in these economies. These
organizations often attempt to facilitate entrepreneurship without transferring and
instilling important venture arrangement scripts, venture willingness scripts, and venture
ability scripts. To maximize impact, entrepreneurship-enabling organizations must begin
the arduous process of institutionalizing venture scripts. The model presented
conceptualizes this process using Social Cognitive Theory to explain how social
connections and interactions introduce, establish, and begin to institutionalize venture

scripts. Two social capital dimensions, bridging social capital and local embeddedness,
are critical for the establishment of these embryonic informal institutions. Essay I
concludes by using the cases of two entrepreneurship-enabling organizations (Milma and
Dastkar from India) to illustrate this process and lead to marked success stories. These
two organizations certainly create opportunity entrepreneurs rather than necessity
entrepreneurs and their example illustrates the power of the conceptual model.
Essay II takes a macro-level approach and examines opportunity entrepreneurship
at the country-level. Specifically, I utilize Whitley’s (1999) national business system’s
framework to better understand society’s aggregate level of opportunity entrepreneurship.
Opportunity entrepreneurship is an active choice to start a new enterprise based on the
perception that an unexploited or underexploited profit opportunity exists. This essay
uses a set theoretic perspective to construct configurations of institutions associated with
various levels of opportunity entrepreneurship. It introduces a relatively new empirical
method, Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (FSQCA), to the country-level
entrepreneurship literature. FSQCA adds rigor to qualitative studies. Four distinct
configurations associated with high levels of opportunity entrepreneurship and three
distinct configurations associated with low opportunity entrepreneurship are identified.
These findings indicate that the ways in which societies foster impactful entrepreneurship
via the national business system and entrepreneurial culture exhibit equifinality and that
institutions and culture can act as both complements and substitutes. I contribute to the
literature by showing that institutions behave in combination, rather than independently,
to produce opportunity entrepreneurship. My use of this method helps push the

entrepreneurship literature towards thinking more configurationally about the role of
institutions.
Essay III, in contrast, takes a multi-level approach. The main purpose of Essay III
is to ascertain whether institutions have a more (or less) meaningful impact on lower
income individuals than higher income individuals. In this essay, I use the institutional
logics perspective to examine the degree to which market logics have sway over
individuals. The institutional logics perspective holds that institutions’ impact on
individuals within a society varies based on characteristics and activities of those
individuals such that some individuals will deviate from dominant institutional logics and
others will not. Analysis is conducted to determine the extent to which variation in
entrepreneurial intentions are explained by cross-level (individual and country-level data)
variation. Two income levels (lower and higher income individuals) are contrasted.
Findings indicate that individuals with higher incomes are better able to deviate from
dominant institutional logics. My cross-level analyses of 49,013 individuals from 48
diverse countries supports the notion that institutions have a greater impact on lowincome individuals with respect to entrepreneurial outcomes. The study contributes to a
more nuanced understanding of embedded agency within the institutional logics
perspective. It bridges the literatures on individual entrepreneurship and the institutional
logics perspective. Furthermore, the study provides context and evidence on the impact of
income on choice and economic well-being.
Overall, the findings of this dissertation make theoretical and empirical
contributions to the literature on institutions and entrepreneurship, particularly the ways
in which institutions impact the global poor. My more fine-grained application of

institutional theory to the entrepreneurship literature is my primary theoretical
contribution. While past research has explored and expounded upon societal institutions’
impact on entrepreneurship, I explore contingencies in this relationship in all three
essays. In Essay I, I theorize about what organization s can do to help advance and build
cognitive institutions. In Essay II, I explore how the relationship between institutions and
a key entrepreneurial outcome is better viewed configurationally rather than as the
independent effect of different institutions. In Essay III, I relax the established
institutions-entrepreneurship relationship by examining how individual income plays a
contingent role in that link.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Institutions, such as market incentives, property rights, corruption control, capital
availability, and bankruptcy laws are all necessary for new business activity to thrive and
grow (e.g. Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; de Soto, 2000; Baumol, Litan & Schramm,
2009;). Therefore, "getting the institutions right," with a strong focus on formal
institutions like those listed above, has been an important theme among social science
scholars searching for solution to troubled and undeveloped economies (e.g. Williamson,
2000; Boettke, Coyne, Leeson & Sautet, 2005).
However, the model linking formal institutions with economic growth via new
venture activity has proven problematic. For instance, post-Socialist countries’ attempts
at rapid market liberalization, or “shock therapy,” via an overhaul of formal institutions
resulted in some unexpectedly negative outcomes, leaving many policy makers
disappointed (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000). Several scholars argued that this
failure occurred because the behavior of economic agents is a result of both correct
market incentives and the historical and social processes that have shaped these agents,
(e.g. Murrell, 1993). It is therefore remarkably unclear as to whether top-down
installation of formal regulatory institutions that run counter to their informal precursors
will actually result in wealth creation.
In this dissertation, I address the consequences of this problem as it relates to a
very salient form of economic activity: entrepreneurship. I propose that the relationship
between institutions and entrepreneurship turns out to be quite complex. I explore the
nuances of these relationships in three ways, in my three essays.
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First, in Chapter 2 , 1 propose that one possible solution to the institutionseconomic activity relationship conundrum is that formal institutions are consequences
and expressions of shared culture, values, and cognitions (North, 1990; Boettke, Coyne &
Leeson, 2008; Holmes, Miller, Hitt & Salmador, 2013). In subsistence economies,
informal institutions, (North, 1990) like entrepreneurial values, expertise, and risk-taking,
may not be ingrained in society. In these economies, informal institutional voids can
inhibit opportunity recognition and exploitation, while normative voids can reduce the
willingness of individuals to take necessary risks (Stenholm, 2011; Webb, Kistruck,
Ireland, & Ketchen, 2011). Therefore, I argue that informal institutions, not formal
institutions, may be the seminal driving force behind entrepreneurship (Welter &
Smallbone, 2011), with formal institutions taking a supporting role as constraints or
moderators. As a result, the impact of improved formal institutions on entrepreneurship
can lead to economic development so long as informal institutions support a thriving
entrepreneurial culture. That is, the impact of new small businesses varies according to
informal institutional context.
Consequently, a primary task of organizations seeking to facilitate new venture
creation is to find ways to undertake the difficult task of transmitting and
institutionalizing entrepreneurial cognitions to subsistence markets. Therefore, in Chapter
2 , 1 draw on past research in entrepreneurship and institutional theory to develop a model
that explains how entrepreneurship-enabling organizations can confront adverse
institutional conditions by transmitting and fostering the development of entrepreneurial
expertise for new venture formation. In sum, I use social cognitive theory to describe and
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explain how entrepreneurship-enabling organizations use social characteristics, local
embeddedness and bridging social capital to be successful in this process.
Chapter 3 takes a country-level look at the institutions-entrepreneurship
relationship. I argue for complexity in this relationship. I put forth both a theoretical and
methodological alternative to these recent approaches attempting to quantify the
institutions-entrepreneurship relationship. Rather than taking a variance decomposition
approach, I view societies’ collections of institutions as configurations. Using linear,
variance decomposition approaches, such as regression, may engender understanding of
which institutional components are most important on average, but they ignore the
possibility of multiple equilibria, i.e. situations in which different bundles of institutions
coevolve together in distinct ways resulting in equifmal ends.
If this is indeed the case, a set-theoretic approach is more appropriate as it
analyzes the institutional environment as a complex gestalt of interacting regulative,
normative, and cultural-cognitive elements. Moreover, such approaches can identify
multiple equilibria associated with a given outcome such that viable paths towards
achieving opportunity entrepreneurship are not ignored. Therefore, I use a less familiar
methodology, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, to investigate the following
research question: How do institutions and culture collectively configure to influence
rates of opportunity entrepreneurship?
I use Whitley’s (1999) national business system framework to examine the
configurational effects of each society’s national business system in combination with
national culture. That is, I view institutions and culture as gestalts that combine together
to lead to entrepreneurial outcomes. Consequently, I argue that elements of formal
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institutional expressions combine with culture to form configurations that may or may not
be sufficient to provide entrepreneurship, and I seek to identify those institutional
configurations that are consistent with opportunity entrepreneurship. Thus, I postulate
that mixed findings may occur because the national business system interacts with
culture’s influence on entrepreneurship in multiple ways. I use fuzzy set analysis to
explore these different institutional-cultural bundles.
Chapter 4, explores another nuance in the institutions-entrepreneurship
relationship. In this essay, I explore the degree to which societal institutions matter given
individual income. This is important because in many 21st century countries, attempted
institutional change has simply failed to infiltrate entire societies. Formal institutional
changes may have been changed in name, but these changes are not enforced
ubiquitously. Particularly, they are not enforced at the lowest levels of society. Thus, in
this essay, I explore the relationship between the importance of institutions and income.
I argue that income level is a key moderator in this relationship. That is, the
relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship is stronger for the poor than the
wealthy. The institutional logics perspective argues that individuals’ responses to
institutions will vary according to situation and individual characteristics (Thornton,
Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012; Friedland, 2013). I use this theory to frame my arguments.
In institutional environments with weak market logics (e.g. institutions for
entrepreneurship), wealthier individuals are in better position to deviate from dominant
behaviors and begin creating identities and goals consistent with entrepreneurship.
Conversely, in societies, where attempts at institutional reform have not been realized in
effect, the poor suffer disproportionately. Therefore, I hypothesize that the societal level
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institutional environment will interact with individual income level such that the effects
of institutions on intentions to launch a new venture will be far stronger for low income
individuals than for high income individuals. This effect occurs for three major reasons:
1. Market logics are unequally distributed within a society. The powerful may have
them but do not grant them to the poor. Thus, capabilities associated with market
logics are unobtainable for the poor.
2. The cognitive accessibility of market logics is lower where other institutional
logics (e.g. family, religion) dominate. Any market logics cognitions the poor
may have are crowded out by cultural embeddedness or are not accessed due to
day to day social situations in which the poor normally participate.
3. The costs of engaging in entrepreneurship are higher in societies without strong
market logics due to lack of available capital and resource scarcity. This
disproportionately effects the poor because they simply cannot afford to act
entrepreneurially due to poverty and the consequences of failure.
I explore the above assertions using hierarchical generalized linear modeling on a sample
taken from the Global Entrepreneurship Model of 49,013 individuals in 48 countries. I
argue that if institutions are going to lead to entrepreneurial outcomes that address
poverty alleviation and development concerns, they must be well enough established to
reach lower income individuals.
Taken together the three essays explore subsequently address nuances in the
institutions-entrepreneurship relationship. The relationship between these constructs is far
more complex than economists, under the “Washington Consensus,” proposed (Easterly,

2001). Changing government regulations does not automatically lead to development.
Because
1. Informal institutions such as the degree to which societies possess
entrepreneurial expertise is critical. Entrepreneurship-enabling organizations
may be able to offer a solution to these problems.
2. Institutions and culture may be complements or substitutes in complex
gestalts. Furthermore, there are equifinal paths to successful outcomes with
regards to entrepreneurship depending upon country characteristics. The
Washington Consensus is not the most appropriate path for all countries.
3. Nominally, changing laws and regulations is not enough. In many countries
attempted top down changes have not taken root in many societies and are not
impacting the poor because the inculcation of market logics has not occurred
at a deep level.
My three essays respectively explore these three nuances.
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CHAPTER 2
ESSAY I: INSTITUTIONALIZING ENTREPRENEURIAL EXPERTISE IN
SUBSISTENCE ECONOMIES
2.1 ABSTRACT
Interest in entrepreneurship in subsistence economies has grown within
international business research due to the failure of foreign aid attempts, limited success
of microfmance, and the relatively unexplored promise of private sector solutions. This
paper focuses on organizations operating in subsistence economies that seek to promote
and support new venture activity in the context of underdeveloped institutions. I label
these organizations, entrepreneurship-enabling organizations (EEOs), and I argue for
their central role in addressing the institutional voids confronting entrepreneurs.
Specifically, I propose that the provision o f venture scripts (expert entrepreneurial

cognitions) is critical to filling institutional voids in these economies. I use social
cognitive and institutional theories to explain how social connections and interactions
introduce, and begin to institutionalize new and productive entrepreneurial venture
scripts. In so doing, I refine and extend our understanding of entrepreneurship in
subsistence economies, as well as our understanding about how EEOs can help to address
institutional voids. In this way, I contribute to the growing international business
literature examining factors influencing entrepreneurship in subsistence economies.
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2.2 INTRODUCTION
A welcome trend in international business (IB) research has been the attention to
issues confronting developing, emerging, and subsistence economies. There is increasing
recognition among scholars that in a global market, issues and events in such economies
also impact developed economies (e.g. Chari, 2013). Understanding the dynamics in
these economies need not only lead to economic development and the well-being of their
citizens, but as recent research on reverse innovation (Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011)
suggests, may even benefit the developed world. Both scholars and policymakers propose
that new ventures may be an antidote to poverty in such economies. This marks a radical
shift in thinking about economic development. While in the past, it was considered the
role of domestic or foreign governments to foster economic development and prosperity,
it is now commonly proposed and accepted that entrepreneurs and private businesses may
be more effective in creating sustainable economic development (e.g. Yunus, 1999;
Prahalad, 2006). To this end, the 21st century has witnessed the rapid growth of the
microfinance industry and other Entrepreneurship-enabling Organizations (EEOs) in
order to fund and create new and viable businesses in subsistence economies. The efforts
and funding in the pursuit this goal have been remarkable (McGuire & Conroy, 2010).
Unfortunately, evidence now suggests that the promise of market-based solutions
to poverty, like EEOs, have not been realized (Baneijee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan,
2009; Bateman & Chang, 2012). A fundamental problem is that they assume that the poor
are informed and creative economic actors. Unfortunately, this is not generally the case
(Kamani, 2009). Individuals launching new ventures in subsistence economies oftentimes
lack the needed expertise to make them vehicles for economic change and development. I
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address this challenge by beginning to answer the following research question: What
characteristics of entrepreneurship-enabling organizations (EEOs) allow them to
introduce key knowledge and expertise required for impactful entrepreneurship to
subsistence economies?
To help address this question, I argue that individuals engaging in
entrepreneurship in subsistence economies may not be successful in creating new
ventures due to multiple institutional voids (Webb, Kistruck, Ireland, & Ketchen, 2010). I
posit that expert venture scripts can help fill and circumvent these voids. Expert venture
scripts are advanced, sequentially ordered, action-based knowledge structures used to
create new ventures (Mitchell & Chesteen, 1995; Mitchell, Smith, Seawright & Morse,
2000). Thus, I propose that a key role of EEOs is to introduce expert venture scripts in
places where poor property rights thwart knowledge creation due to value appropriation
concerns. To develop a model that explains how EEOs transmit and foster the
development of expert venture scripts, I draw on both social cognitive theory and
institutional theory.
Indeed, many successful EEOs such as the Mowgli Foundation operating in the
Middle East and Northern Africa, BRAC in Bangladesh and throughout southern Asia,
and Peruventures in Peru have helped to transmit and implement institutions conducive
to the growth of entrepreneurial ventures. The institutional entrepreneurship literature has
called these embryonic practices, rules and technologies which initially only impact an
organization’s immediate domain, “proto-institutions” (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips.,
2002). Within subsistence economies, proto-institutions can serve to fill institutional
voids and aid entrepreneurs by diffusing localized and informal institutional structures for
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entrepreneurs. I theorize that EEOs must focus on two dimensions — bridging social
capital and local embeddedness — that independently and in concert help to introduce,
diffuse, proliferate, and ultimately institutionalize expert venture scripts.
My study contributes to both the entrepreneurship and international business
literatures in several ways. First, I offer a case for the importance of expert venture
scripts in subsistence economies. The possession of expert venture scripts likely
distinguishes high growth entrepreneurs from those involved in self-employment because
they have no other options (Acs, 2006). In subsistence economies, entrepreneurship
participation is in fact higher than in developed economies (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007), but
these entrepreneurs generally have no substantive impact on economic development.
Simply funding entrepreneurs and not improving the quality of entrepreneurship in these
regions is not sufficient. Shifting the focus to the importance of entrepreneurial expertise
in these regions has been a missing piece of the development puzzle.
Second, I add to the emerging institutional entrepreneurship literature by
describing how EEOs work to construct new institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991;
Lawrence et al., 2002) by developing informal proto-institutions in contexts where they
are highly applicable. The importance of institutionalized formal market-based behaviors
has become increasingly evident in recent years with scholars identifying the
shortcomings associated with reforms in regulatory institutional alone in subsistence
economies (Easterly, 2001). To address this issue, I contribute to current understanding
of the initiation and diffusion of expert venture scripts by describing their social networkbased antecedents.
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Third, by focusing on the linkages and interactions that foster proto-institutions in
subsistence economies, this study builds bridges between the international business and
the institutional entrepreneurship literatures. EEOs connecting entrepreneurs to
information and knowledge about entrepreneurial processes and market opportunities
help to narrow the knowledge and technology gap between subsistence and developed
economies (Acosta et al., 2011). However, in subsistence economies, organizations
seeking to cultivate the internationalization of tacit expert venture scripts require a good
degree of local embeddedness. When exogenous (international) and endogenous elements
coalesce, the result is more likely to be a dynamic and contextually-adapted business
model that is viable within an economy consisting of antagonistic and/or weak
institutions.
We begin the theory development section by describing the nature of expert
venture scripts and discussing Social Cognitive Theory, which explains the means by
which scripts can be socially transmitted. As expert venture scripts are spread and shared
they serve as proto-institutions capable of sustaining entrepreneurial activity with growth
potential. I then develop propositions examining how EEOs can facilitate the generation
of expert venture scripts using bridging social capital and local embeddedness. After
describing the model, I provide two concrete examples of EEOs in India that have helped
to institutionalize expert venture scripts.
2.3 THEORY DEVELOPMENT
Entrepreneurial Expertise in Subsistence Economies
According to entrepreneurial cognition scholars (e.g. Mitchell et al, 2002), experts
differ from non-experts in that they have knowledge structures in integral domains
allowing them to succeed where those who do not have access to them cannot. These
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knowledge structures are known as “expert scripts” (Glaser, 1984). Expert scripts are
advanced, sequentially-ordered knowledge structure specific to a task or field (Leddo &
Abelson, 1986).
The knowledge o f experts stands in contrast to the knowledge of novices, which is
topical instead of contextual. That is, novices’ knowledge must be organized around the
explicit rather than what can be inferred. Experts, on the other hand, have the ability to
make contextual inferences from information derived and distilled from past experiences
(Glaser, 1984). That is, expertise depends on contextually framed knowledge (Chi,
Glaser, & Farr, 1988) that comes from understanding the sequences and regularities of
task specific circumstances (Mitchell, 1994). Entrepreneurs using expert venture scripts
are able to make sound and timely judgments, including the careful evaluation of
opportunities and the decision to create a new venture. These individuals use
“simplifying mental models to piece together previously unconnected information that
helps them to identify and invent new products or services, and to assemble the necessary
resources to start and grow businesses” (Mitchell et al., 2002).
Expert venture scripts have been shown to have significance in entrepreneurial
success and decision making in a variety of national contexts. However, their actual
levels vary across institutional conditions (Lim, Morse, Mitchell, & Seawright, 2010).
This heterogeneity is in keeping with the Austrian perspective (Hayek, 1945) that holds
that knowledge and information are unevenly dispersed among actors and throughout
societies.
In subsistence economies, information needed for entrepreneurial processes is
relatively scarce (Darr & Pretzsch, 2008). Past ethnographies (i.e. Geertz, 1978) indicate
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that there is often widespread ignorance about alternatives to the goods, services, and
ways of doing business that have characterized life for generations. The expertise and
knowledge needed for new venture formation is often absent. Hence, examining venture
script formation in subsistence economies may be one way to overcome the considerable
institutional voids that confront entrepreneurs in these contexts.
Mitchell et al. (2000) proposed three types of expert knowledge structures or
scripts that are needed for new venture formation: venture arrangement scripts, venture
willingness scripts, and venture ability scripts. Venture arrangement scripts are the
knowledge structures individuals possess about the provisions and tools needed to engage
in an entrepreneurial endeavor. These knowledge structures include “a protectable idea,
access to resources, and venture specific skills” (Lim et al., 2010: 495). People in
subsistence economies have a difficult time exploiting opportunities due to a lack of
knowledge about venture specific skills and resources. Individuals with low levels of
education, a lack of prior non-subsistence work experience, very limited Internet access,
and a social network made up of only close tightknit ties will be unlikely to have
exposure to venture arrangement scripts.
Venture ability scripts are “the capabilities, skills, knowledge, norms, and
attitudes that individuals require to create a venture, such as ability-opportunity fit,
venturing diagnostic ability, and venture situational knowledge” (Lim et al., 2010). These
scripts concern the ability to recognize opportunities through new combinations of
people, materials, or products (Kirzner, 1982; Mitchell et al., 2000), the ability to
understand the systematic elements involved in the creation of new ventures (Krueger &
Carsrud, 1993; Mitchell et al., 2000) and the ability to use previous market experience
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and apply the knowledge it provides to a specific situation (Mitchell et al., 2000; Stuart &
Abetti, 1990). In subsistence markets, few consider alternatives to traditional goods or
services due to information barriers, which freezes the entrepreneurship process.
Additionally, low levels o f education and prior business experiences with profitable
ventures may limit the ability to make sound day-to-day business operation decisions,
shape strategy, and adapt the business model in the exploitation stage.
Finally, venture willingness scripts include the inclination and motivation to try
new things, assume risk, and take action in the face of uncertainty (Mitchell et al., 2000).
Subsistence economies are again riddled with problems in their ability to support venture
willingness scripts. Most small business activity takes place within a familial or
communal context. Often individuals are unwilling to strain close familial and communal
ties to pursue opportunities (Ansari, Munir & Gregg, 2012). Individuals who forsake their
family business and strike out on their own may be viewed as greedy, disloyal, and
reckless. Failure can lead to serious social repercussions. Reinforcing these informal
institutions, the regulatory institutional environment dissuades people from risk-taking.
Transmission of Venture Scripts via Social Cognitions
One model of entrepreneurial cognition development holds that expert venture
scripts are transmitted through interactions and experiences with experts (Mitchell &
Chesteen, 1995; Lim et al., 2010). These scholars use social cognitive theory to provide
an explanation for the individual and dyadic-based mechanisms that transmit cognitions
and behaviors (Rizzello & Turvani, 2002). Social cognition theorists maintain that
individuals’ knowledge o f how to act in situations and what to believe about themselves
and their activities is learned through observing others via social interactions (Bandura,

17
1986). Also, cognitions occur within the framework of a perceived social environment
(Bandura, 1989).
As exposure to common successful behaviors increases, individuals tend to
imitate it. As they encounter others’ successes or failures, individuals learn lessons and
adjust their behavior accordingly. Thus, social cognitive theory stipulates that a large
portion of human behavior is learned from other agents in the environment (Bandura,
1986). Indeed, social cognition scholars have observed that institutions arise via social
interaction by which collections of individuals and organizations promote the common
cognitions, processes, and practices that define their domain (Dacin, Munir & Tracey,
2010 ).

The relevance of social cognitive theory for entrepreneurship is that individuals
with exposure to a business ecology of successful venture formation gain valuable
socially derived experiences that enable them to develop expert cognitions. These
individuals can subsequently act upon these expert cognitions whenever they observe a
cue in their social environment. Mitchell (1994) argued that expert venture scripts can be
developed in novices through extensive exposure to experts. Similarly, Lim et al., (2010)
describe how expert information gleaned by exposure to expert founders of new ventures
increases venture creation decisions.
Social cognitions propagate learned and mimicked behaviors (Rizzello & Turvani,
2002). Ultimately, as cognitions spread via repeated and increased interactions, they are
socially reinforced and eventually may become institutionalized. Thus, social cognitive
theory and institutional theory reinforce each other and explain institutional convergence
and divergence. In this way, social cognitive theory offers an explanation for how
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entrepreneurial expertise can be transmitted and become institutionalized at a societal
level. In other words, as individuals are surrounded by experts, they are exposed to
behaviors conducive to successful venture formation. Expertise begets expertise, and
ultimately, the repeated pattern is institutionalized.
These institutionalized behavioral norms and cognitions in turn initiate, shape,
and form boundaries around entrepreneurial opportunities and actions (Aldrich &
Waldinger, 1990; Davidsson & Wiklund, 1997; Shane, 1993). Unfortunately, in
subsistence economies, productive entrepreneurial behaviors are not normative but
deviations, if they exist at all; expert venture scripts in these contexts are underdeveloped,
sparsely distributed, and not institutionalized. EEOs wishing to develop and establish
expert venture scripts must engage in institutional entrepreneurship.
Institutional Entrepreneurship in Subsistence Economies
Institutions in Subsistence Economies
The variety of institutions and their effects on economic outcomes in subsistence
economies is a complex phenomenon. Recent work has asserted that institutions drive
economic growth and development and not vice-versa (Boettke & Fink, 2011). Property
rights, market incentives, corruption control, capital availability, and bankruptcy laws
have all been identified as important for new business activity to be launched and to
thrive (e.g. Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; Baumol, Litan & Schramm, 2009).
Notably, Boettke and Coyne (2009, 158) point out that, “Only under a certain
institutional environment will entrepreneurs have an incentive to discover new resources,
substitutes for existing resources or trading partners to obtain resources... [0]nly in
certain institutional contexts will entrepreneurs have an incentive to discover new
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technological knowledge such as new production processes or new organization
structures.” These problems are exacerbated in subsistence economies because the
economic actors in these contexts face great potential loss— social exclusion, a variety of
deprivations, and even starvation—if their search is not productive.
Therefore, "getting the institutions right," with a strong focus on formal
institutions has been an important theme among social science scholars searching for
solutions to troubled and undeveloped economies (e.g. Williamson, 2000; Boettke,
Coyne, Leeson & Sautet, 2005). Good formal institutions establish safeguards for the
creation of knowledge, intellectual property, wealth, and other resources that are all key
components of entrepreneurship while poor institutions curtail entrepreneurial effort
(Bowen & De Clercq, 2007).
Unfortunately, formal institutions cannot be easily introduced to many subsistence
economies (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008; Boettke & Coyne, 2009) because they
often conflict with indigenous belief systems and historical path dependencies (Boettke &
Coyne, 2009). The failure of nation-building activities, introduction of foreign
governance systems, and MNE strategies from developed economies suggests that the
establishment of new formal institutions is not a straightforward undertaking. For
example, post-Communist countries’ attempts at rapid market liberalization, or “shock
therapy,” via an overhaul o f formal institutions resulted in some unexpectedly negative
outcomes (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000).
Instead of working for top-down formal institutional changes, EEOs are better
positioned to help create bottom-up informal institutional changes by introducing expert
venture scripts -m y central theoretical premise. In other words, EEOs wishing to promote
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and develop entrepreneurship in the face of these challenges can accomplish their
objectives by addressing many of the symptoms of poor property rights and other formal
institutional voids through revision of informal cognitive structures. This is particularly
salient given that recent research suggests that informal institutions may be particularly
important at very low levels of economic development (Williamson & Mathers, 2011).
Indeed, the successes of many EEOs in places like India, Latin America, and Ghana show
that poor formal institutions with weak property rights protections can in fact be
circumvented (Bradley, McMullen, Artz, & Simiyu, 2012). Such organizations are taking
actions to shape the behavioral norms and default cognitions in subsistence economies by
engaging in institutional entrepreneurship.
Institutional Entrepreneurship
Institutional entrepreneurship encompasses modifications and transformations of
the formal and informal rules of the game (Boettke & Coyne, 2009). Institutional
entrepreneurs are on theforefront of taking actions that lead collective efforts in infusing
new beliefs, values, and norms into their business arenas (e.g. Mair, Marti, & Ventresca,
2012). Notably afew studies have examined theroleof institutional entrepreneurship for
entrepreneurs (e.g. Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002). These studies have recognized
that entrepreneurs in emerging economies often construct institutions that help nascent
ventures develop processes and gain legitimacy in order to establish, promote, and protect
their emergent venture or industry (DiMaggio, 1988; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lawrence et
al., 2002; Ahlstrom, Bruton & Yeh, 2008).
Therefore, to confront institutional voids facing entrepreneurs, EEOs can establish
a smaller, more confined set of institutional components that help to nurture
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entrepreneurs, insulate them from a hostile or unsupportive institutional field, and
promote new venture creation. These lower-level emergent institutions are what have
been termed “proto-institutions” (Lawrence et al., 2002; Webb, et al., 2010). Proto
institutions are the
Practices, technologies, and rules that are narrowly diffused and only
weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to become widely
institutionalized, as proto-institutions. These new practices, technologies,
and rules are institutions in the making: they have the potential to become
full-fledged institutions if social processes develop that entrench them and
they are diffused throughout an institutional field (Lawrence, et al., 2002:
419).
Proto-institutions are, by definition, informal in nature institutions since they have
not yet been codified. The term proto-institution denotes that these informal institutions
are in a nascent stage and can potentially take root in larger society. Not all proto
institutions will grow, develop, and become engrained in the social fabric as a broader
institution (Zeitz, Mittal, & McAulay, 1999). However, as a variety of individuals and
organizations adopt them, they can eventually become broadly institutionalized. By
generating, implementing, diffusing, instilling, and enforcing the practices, knowledge
and rules required for venture growth, EEOs s can address institutional deficiencies by
developing informal institutions that are vital to the entrepreneurship process. The
emergence of proto-institutions often occurs through the interactions of organizations and
key stakeholders (Lawrence et al., 2002). Webb et al., (2010), describing subsistence
economies, note that proto-institutions
allow entrepreneurs to form internal capital markets, secure access to
important factors, gain legitimacy from an informal institution’s
standpoint, and avoid negative implications (i.e., bribery and other corrupt
behaviors) of formal institutional voids (Webb et al., 2010: 567).
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To this list I add that proto-institutions can also provide regions of societies with the
expert knowledge structures that characterize successful new ventures. That is, EEOs
may introduce expert venture scripts as a special type of informal proto-institution. In
other words, EEOs leverage social networks. In so doing, they sow the seeds of new yet
vital informal institutions which are crucial in impoverished regions where broader
societal level institutions are traditionally hostile or unsupportive.
Institutionalizing Venture Scripts
An economic development model specifying informal institution change initiated
by social networks stands in stark contrast to the model advocating dramatic formal
institutional changes for economic growth and development. Transferring venture scripts
via social pathways pushes new venture activity rather than merely hoping that formal
institutions pull it forward. However, since informal institutions are behavioral and
cognitive in nature, the institutionalization of venture scripts must be accomplished
slowly by leveraging social network-based characteristics. The transfer process requires
learning through social interactions with experts.
Consistent with this scheme, Mitchell and Chesteen (1995) showed that venture
scripts spread by means of a two-stage process involving exposure to venture scripts and
participation (i.e. mentorship). These two processes share a very social characteristic in
which (1) access to a broad range of experts and (2) time spent observing their behaviors
lead to the successful and accelerated acquisition of expert venture scripts (Mitchell &
Chesteen 1995). Given the very social process of script transmission, dimensions of
social capital are key conditions for the institutionalization of venture scripts. Therefore,
as an organizational analog to Mitchell & Chesteen (1995), I propose that EEOs can
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utilize two interacting social antecedents for venture script development: bridging social
capital and local embeddedness to transmit and establish informal proto-institutions
(venture scripts) in subsistence economies.
Bridging Social Capital
The technology transfer literature emphasizes knowledge flows that enhance
national capabilities via exogenous sources (Feinberg & Majumdar, 2001; Tihanyi &
Roath, 2002; Jindra, Giroud, & Scott-Kennel, 2009) like social capital. Social capital
describes the potential benefits that stem from the goodwill, favoritism, reciprocity, and
cooperation among and between individuals and groups (Narayan-Parker, 1999). These
benefits may include resources, information, and legitimacy. Bridging social capital
concerns those benefits that stem from looser ties of respect and mutuality among people
who are socioeconomically, geographically, or ethnically dissimilar (Szreter &
Woolcock, 2004; Ansari et al., 2012). Diverse relationships or weak ties allow people to
be integrated into a wider society or market (e.g. Granovetter, 1973). “Novel information
is thought to flow more smoothly through weak ties than strong ties. Cohesive social
networks may constrain both behavior and the flow of information due to strong social
norms that are active within the networks” (Poortinga, 2012: 287). Homophily, the
propensity for people to bond with those similar to themselves, constrains information
flows, narrowing people’s choices to the knowledge, news, worldview, and cognitive
pathways of close friends (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). A broader range of
information increases its value, applicability, and timeliness (Adler & Kwon, 2002).
This is particularly meaningful in subsistence economies where information is
scarce (Geertz, 1978). By exposing local actors to advanced knowledge, technology, and
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experiences, bridging social capital pushes back cognitive boundaries and allows
entrepreneurs to access sources of information on best practices, management expertise,
and various market opportunities. In this way, resident entrepreneurs can observe and
interact with expert behavioral patterns that help facilitate entrepreneurial activities such
as opportunity recognition, venture specific skills, and delivering goods to market.
The process of transfer of expert venture scripts plays out at a very micro-level in
which local actors are provided with access to experts by well-connected EEOs. Recent
research indicates that such connections can help improve performance of entrepreneurial
ventures in subsistence economies (Sutter, Kistruck, & Morris, 2014). When individuals
seek to transfer important knowledge in subsistence economies they must make
alterations to business practices and processes in order to make them fit local conditions
(Sutter et al., 2014). For this reason, the most successful knowledge transfer practices
necessarily transfer the principles and concepts underlying it (Baden-Fuller & Winter,
2005).
Individuals with expert venture scripts possess both a detailed understanding of
individual practices surrounding the core business model as well as a comprehensive
grasp of why different processes are in place (Mitchell et al., 2000). Because of their
grasp of the logic underpinning venture scripts, the information these experts share with
recipients can be highly targeted, matching suitable adaptations to local requirements
without damaging core processes for value creation. (Sutter et al., 2014). Through these
interactions, local entrepreneurs acquire new venture arrangement scripts, which lead to a
more thorough understanding of many of the tacit meanings underlying prescribed
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business-specific practices. Thus, connections with experts constitute important social
bridges to new entrepreneurial expertise.
The impact of social bridges has been highlighted recently by the international
entrepreneurship literature. Musteen, Francis, and Datta (2010) found that the proportion
of internationally connected ties of the entrepreneur is positively associated with the
speed of internationalization of the venture and this relationship is stronger when
entrepreneur shares a common language with his/her ties. Kiss, Danis, and Cavusgil
(2012), in their international entrepreneurship research review, also acknowledged the
positive impact of ties on internationalization initiatives in emerging and less developed
countries. Domestic networks have a positive impact on new venture internationalization
in both transition economies (Manolova, Manev, & Gyoshev, 2010) and emerging
economies (e.g. Ellis, 2000; Lin & Chaney, 2007) due to advantages they provide in
lowering costs and/or product differentiation. This strategy works especially well for
small and new firms attempting to establish new ventures. “Small players [are] able to
exploit advantages from being part of a network, such as low transaction costs, assured
orders, and access to external resources and knowledge” (Manolova et al., 2010: 259).
The international entrepreneurship literature not only highlights the impact that
social bridges can play in knowledge transfer regarding production processes and
technology but also their importance in providing knowledge about markets. Due to
technology and knowledge gaps, entrepreneurship in subsistence economies often
depends upon markets in developed economies (London, Anupindi, & Sheth, 2010;
Ramachandran, Pant, & Pani, 2011, Smith & Pezeshkan, 2013). London et al. (2010)
found that market constraints severely hampered local entrepreneurs attempting to
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produce and sell goods in Africa, South Asia and Latin America. Similarly
Ramachandran et al. (2012) report that entrepreneurs in subsistence economies lack
awareness of market trends. Ibeh (2003) found that access to networks increased the
export entrepreneurial orientation among entrepreneurs in Nigeria by giving them
information about consumers and demand overseas. Expert provided knowledge of
international markets increases venture ability scripts via increased opportunity
recognition. Further, connections to a broader and diverse group of consumers and
markets reduce the risk that entrepreneurs assume in initiating a new venture, increasing
self-efficacy, resulting in the enhancement of venture willingness. Thus, information
about distant markets gained from social bridges can enhance both venture ability and
willingness scripts.
In sum, EEOs possessing bridging social capital, including ties to other countries
are able to provide knowledge regarding technology, processes, and markets by
connecting subsistence actors to a broader spectrum of information regarding the
existence and successful implementation of viable and profitable opportunities.
Therefore, I propose:
Proposition 1: An entrepreneurship-enabling organization’s ability to transmit
venture scripts to potential entrepreneurs living in subsistence economies depends
on its possession of bridging social capital.
Local Embeddedness
Along with the initial transfer of expert venture scripts, EEOs wishing to transfer
new knowledge and practices must focus on the post-adoption period (Bessant & Rush,
1995). Simple exposure to expert venture scripts does not assure their effective
application; instead, the acquisition of expert venture scripts requires a learning process
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in order for organizations and individuals to maximize their functionality (Mitchell &
Chesteen, 1995). EEOs that are locally embedded offer two advantages.
First, after venture expert venture scripts are introduced, EEOs with local
embeddedness are able to both incubate them and adapt them to the local context. This is
because deep interactions that occur when EEOs are locally embedded allow them to
better understand the skills and weaknesses of entrepreneurs and the challenges that they
face. In depth collaboration between the expert, possessing the scripts and the principles
underlying them, and the entrepreneur, possessing information regarding his or her
resource bundle and local market constraints, results in a situationally apposite
knowledge recombination. Once this occurs, an appropriate business model can be
constructed by retaining the central aims of exogenously introduced venture scripts but
altering the business model to fit the local context.
Local embeddedness allows organizations to take the original core idea or
technology and use “jugaad” principles in order to make them viable. In India, the notion
of jugaad (Radjou, Prabhu, & Ahuja, 2012) describes resourceful innovation that
emphasizes frugality, flexibility, and inclusivity. This is important in a market
characterized by uncertainty and low munificence because entrepreneurial scripts from
developed countries may need substantive adaptation in a different context, such as India.
Expert venture scripts can aid in inferential processes like jugaad.
By ensuring that adaptations continue to meet the technical intent of the original
practice, the template can maintain its value as a guide and referent throughout the
implementation process but also be flexible (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007). London and Hart
(2004: 365) report that “maintaining flexibility in the product and the business model can
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allow local entrepreneurs, who are more familiar with local culture and customer needs,
to innovate proactively.” In this way highly involved social interaction can serve as an
integral knowledge transfer mechanism (Hansen, 1999; Reagans & McEvily, 2003). To
ensure these interactions, EEOs can use locally embedded teams. These teams can gain a
better appreciation for what types of expertise are needed, and, in turn, model
entrepreneurial behavior, present market opportunities, and properly tailor products and
business.
A second benefit of local embeddedness relates to trust and its effects on venture
willingness scripts. Social Cognitive Theory involves the evaluation of other actors’
activities and their perceived consequences. For this reason economic activities in
subsistence economies utilize informal networks which put a premium on societal trust,
enforce normative values, and rely on family ties (De Soto, 2000). However, outside of
individuals’ social networks, institutional voids create very high transaction costs and
risks (Webb, et al., 2010), reducing economic cooperation and escalating distrust.
Individuals with little experience and economic interaction within a market-based system
(Geertz, 1978) may be hesitant to form meaningful economic relationships with outsider
EEOs. Without being locally embedded, EEOs may be viewed as illegitimate, met with
distrust, and be branded as outsiders and viewed as overly risky.
The enactment of venture willingness scripts often requires local actors to have
successful interactions with the EEO. By embedding themselves in local networks, EEOs
cultivate the development of proto-institutions which serve as substitutes for missing
informal institutional elements within the organization’s domain. Locally embedded
EEOs gain credibility by acquiring an intimate perspective of the local context and
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interacting with potential partners and patrons. As individuals perceive an EEO’s
business model and actors as well-meaning and competent, they will be much more likely
to discard reservations about leaving subsistence activities, specializing in a specific task,
and trying something new. Thus, local embeddedness is crucial for the development of
venture willingness scripts. Therefore:
Proposition 2: Entrepreneurship-enabling Organizations with higher levels of
local embeddedness are more capable of providing venture scripts for potential
entrepreneurs in subsistence economies than those without high levels of local
embeddedness.
The Interaction o f Social Capital and Local Embeddedness
The first two propositions describe how social interactions and the flow of
complex and often tacit information facilitate the transfer, diffusion and entrenchment of
informal institutions (expert venture scripts). Bridging social capital aids EEOs in the
transmission of complex venture scripts from experts while local embeddedness
generates the time, space and repeated interactions necessary for these proto-institutions
to take root via increases in trust and understanding. While each of these separate
dimensions aid in the institutionalization of expert venture scripts in subsistence
economies, their confluence is necessary in order for EEOs to optimize their impact.
Brugmann and Prahalad (2007) championed the idea of cocreation as an
important MNE strategy for subsistence economies. Cocreation, they argued, creates
viable business opportunities by developing business models which integrate technical
expertise from MNEs to work alongside NGOs contextual understanding of resource
constraints and people’s needs. Central to this idea of cocreation is the idea that when
exogenous and endogenous forces for change combine, the results can be a highly
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tailored and dynamic business model capable of withstanding institutional weaknesses
and antagonistic forces.
Our model takes a similar approach by marrying exogenous social bridges with
locally embedded organizations in order to provide the full benefit of expert venture
script transfer. As the Austrian perspective would predict (e.g. Hayek, 1945), where there
is information heterogeneity, exogenous flows of resources and information are necessary
to apply an outside jolt to markets that may possess a good deal of inertia due to local
information constraints. However, the benefits of these inward flows cannot be realized
without customizing to local institutional constraints. Thus, the model in this study
underscores the importance of both badly needed expert venture scripts from outside the
context and the ability to tailor these scripts as well as gain trust and willingness at a local
context tailoring of solutions in order to initiate viable new proto-institutions.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2.1 shows the outcomes expected among individual entrepreneurs in terms
o f venture script provision and impact due to variation in these two social dimensions.
Quadrant I describes the situation in which EEOs have low levels of bridging social
capital and local embeddedness or in which local entrepreneurs act alone without access
to EEOs. Here, individuals do not gain entrepreneurial expertise and are left to deal with
local institutional conditions alone. New ventures launched under this situation are
unlikely to rise above subsistence level.
Individuals involved with EEOs in Quadrant II are in a slightly better position.
These entrepreneurs may gain a narrow range of expert venture scripts due to support and
interactions with local grassroots EEOs, but lack of information and expertise transfer
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will significantly reduce growth potential. The wide range of venture scripts that
international social bridges can provide will limit the scalability of these new ventures.
Many of the venture scripts associated with business specific technology and market
opportunities will not be available in this situation.
Conversely, individuals involved with EEOs in Quadrant III have a high degree of
bridging social capital but are not locally embedded can introduce best practices and
expertise to local communities by connecting them with experts and knowledge about
markets and capital sources. However, their impact will also be limited without the
ability to adapt the business model to local conditions, to gain the trust of local
individuals, and to provide extended interactions in which expert venture scripts can be
modeled. Since expert scripts are acquired through sustained experience which allow
them to be stored in long term memory (Mitchell & Chesteen, 1995), individuals whose
exposure to the scripts is limited can gain a sense of what actions need to occur but do not
truly become experts.
Entrepreneurs in Quadrant IV have exposure to EEOs with both network-based
benefits. These individuals will reap the greatest advantages from expert venture scripts.
By utilizing bridging social capital in conjunction with local embeddedness through
sustained social interaction, cognitions encountered from exogenous social bridges are
altered, trust increases, and entrepreneurial expertise can be gradually institutionalized.
EEOs with both network-based characteristics provide access to a broad range of experts
as well as extended interactions and time spent in which individuals can observe their
behaviors. Without access to bridging social capital, both the range and radicalness of
new expert venture scripts is limited. Without local embeddedness, the deep interactions
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necessary for a high degree of expertise to develop cannot occur. The combination of
both network-based benefits maximizes the successful and accelerated acquisition of
expert venture scripts.
Furthermore, EEOs introducing and nurturing proto-institutional expert venture
scripts will be more effective than a generic, top-down transfer of institutional structures
from developed economies. This approach involves locally embedded EEOs introducing
elements of institutions and then working to help them evolve to fit the local
environment. In this way, not only are expert venture scripts introduced and established,
but as proto-institutions, they can begin to take root and potentially spread through
society. Therefore I propose:
Proposition 3: Entrepreneurship-enabling organizations with higher levels of
both bridging social capital and local embeddedness are the most capable o f

providing venture scripts for potential entrepreneurs operating in subsistence
economies in comparison with other Entrepreneurship-enabling organizations.
Venture Script Institutionalization and Venture Quality
Specifying what success means in a subsistence economy is important as scholars
have argued that current entrepreneurial activities in these contexts often do not lead to
growth and development. (Acs, 2006; Bowen & De Clercq, 2007). Instead, much of the
small business activity occurring there is the result of individuals having to resort to selfemployment because they perceive no other economic options and are attempting only to
survive. To address this issue, the theoretical model proposed here extends existing work
on venture scripts (i.e. Mitchell et al., 2000; Lim et al., 2010) by focusing on high quality
new ventures rather than simply examining venture creation decisions.
Past entrepreneurial cognition researchers primarily examined how venture scripts
influence venture creation decisions (Mitchell et al. 2000; Mitchell et al., 2002; Lim et al.
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2010). A venture creation decision is simply the determination to begin a new business
for the purpose of either creating a new product or service or for targeting a new market.
They argue that entrepreneurs utilize their venture arrangement, willingness, and ability
scripts to take the appropriate actions (i.e. find, evaluate, and exploit opportunities) at the
appropriate juncture. Would-be entrepreneurs in this framework face two unique
challenges in subsistence contexts.
First, due to the social transmission of venture scripts, a lack of expert venture
scripts within a society greatly decreases the likelihood that would-be entrepreneurs will
acquire them. Since they are surrounded by an economic environment that is largely
devoid of expert venture scripts for productive entrepreneurship, they do not acquire
them via the social cognitive pathways suggested by past research (Lim et al., 2010).
Second, in the face of the first problem, developing expert venture scripts through
organic and natural pathways can take a good deal of time and resources. Some
researchers (e.g. Glaser, 1984) have even suggested that developing entrepreneurial
expertise may take up to ten years to develop. This is particularly problematic in
subsistence economies because search may lead to deprivations that threaten existence as
well as social exclusion. Often, individuals simply cannot afford to abandon subsistence
activities to pursue different venture ventures (i.e. become serial entrepreneurs). Search
costs are simply too high. Fortunately, as noted above, exposure to experts can accelerate
this process (Mitchell & Chesteen, 1995).
Lack of venture scripts and high acquisition costs create a unique role for EEOs.
As individuals receive scripts from EEOs, they are able to develop the expertise
necessary for value-creating entrepreneurship. A primary difference between expert
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entrepreneurs and novice entrepreneurs is the knowledge base that expert entrepreneurs
have acquired through experience (Glaser, 1984). Expert entrepreneurs use domain
familiarity to recognize relevant categories (e.g. potential opportunities) more easily than
novice entrepreneurs. In turn, these categories suggest appropriate actions to the experts.
Whereas, novice entrepreneurs may organize knowledge about forming a venture around
specific characteristics and surface features of a contextualized problem, expert
entrepreneurs quickly apply a general principle due to their venture creation related
schema. These principles subsume the specifics of the problem or situation (Lord &
Maher, 1993). Then, expert entrepreneurs apply their expertise in a superior fashion
because their organized knowledge improves their ability to self-monitor themselves.
The result is that expert entrepreneurs are more likely to make venture creation
decisions with high growth potential due to superior abilities to evaluate and exploit
opportunities. Specifically, individuals with expert venture scripts regarding the use of
resources, idea protection, social networks, and venture specific knowledge (venture
arrangement scripts), scripts that allow them to easily see opportunities that can create
value, evaluate new ventures, and to draw on lessons regarding the successful
exploitation of a new venture (venture ability scripts), and scripts relating to risk
tolerance and opportunity motivation (venture willingness scripts) will develop thinking
patterns and ways of acting that will distinguish them from non-entrepreneurs (Smith,
Mitchell, & Mitchell, 2009). Because they are based on experts’ beliefs that an
unexploited or underexploited business opportunity exists or can be created, these new
ventures are more likely to lead to growth and wealth creation. Therefore, I propose:
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Proposition 4: The greater the extent to which venture scripts are transferred,
diffused and entrenched by entrepreneurship-enabling organization, the greater its
ability to generate high quality ventures in a subsistence economy.
Figure 2.2 shows the proposed relationships linking the sociological aspects of venture
creation decisions with expert venture scripts and ultimately, successful venture creation
decisions.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]

2.4 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF EEOs IN SUBSISTENCE ECONOMIES
We provide illustrative examples of how EEOs can provide, diffuse, and
institutionalize venture scripts in an important subsistence economy - India. Within India,
the transfer of expert venture scripts is absolutely necessary because the norms generated
by the caste system have made entrepreneurship unattractive to many capable individuals.
The two successful examples provide concrete case studies illustrating how this study’s
theory applies in practice. Founded more than 30 years ago, Milma and Dastkar have
each created successful new venture opportunities for thousands of individuals by
providing and institutionalizing venture scripts. Milma and Dastkar each provided
bridging social capital and a locally embedded supportive presence to poor individuals
who were previously very isolated from exogenous information flows.1
Milma
Milma is a dairy farming cooperative that has raised the productivity and living
standards of thousands in the Indian state of Kerala. Milma channels milk from rural
Keralite dairy farmers to urban areas and provides them a stable market and price by
enabling them to produce, collect, process, and sell over 250 million gallons of milk each
1See Geertz, 1978 for more an in depth description of poor information flow in
subsistence economies.
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year. By 2010 Milma had grown to a massive dairy cooperative with 2678 dairy farming
“societies” and over 830,000 farming entrepreneurs, roughly 15% of the state’s
population, with 32,000 more employees working directly for Milma, as shippers,
veterinarians, feed producers, and retailers. Milma’s vast network serves dairy products to
millions of consumers in urban markets in India and abroad (Milma, 2014). Prior to the
emergence of Milma and a few other dairy cooperatives to India in the 1980’s, the milk
market was fragmented and unreliable.
With regards to bridging social capital, Milma provided experts who taught local
dairy farmers about animal husbandry and care to maximize the life, health, and
productivity of their herds (Joseph, 2012). Specifically farmers in the cooperative were
shown how to select bulls to be used in artificial insemination by experts from
Switzerland. The same bull can be used to sire hundreds if not thousands of offspring.
Each year Milma artificially inseminates about 100,000 cattle at 141 different A.I.
centers. Additionally, prior to Milma’s arrival small dairy farmers had no experience in
marketing their product. To address the lack of expertise, Milma provided the farmers
with trained marketers in order to aggressively market milk to the surrounding cities and
states. These marketers, in turn, used formal relationships with distributors and store
owners to help connect the dairy farmers with markets (Joseph, 2007). As a result,
different units have been able to initiate technology upgrades in order to adopt standards
required for an export license. Consequently, Milma began exporting dairy products to
countries such as Saudi Arabia, Australia, South Africa and several other countries in
2012 (Zauba, 2014).
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Around 1980, Milma and several other milk producing cooperatives were
launched by embedding pioneering teams that would begin producing milk in different
regions, to determine what activities were successful and how to implement them. Their
goal was to iron out kinks in the business model and engender a sense of trust in modem
dairy farming techniques. Kurien (2007), one of the movement’s founders, describes his
experiences in the following passages that help illustrate how local embeddedness leads
to venture ability and arrangement scripts:
One or more ‘spearhead teams’ of highly qualified personnel are sent to
one or several villages that constitute their learning laboratory or pilot site.
Here the teams develop a familiarity with the problem in question from the
beneficiaries’ perspective and try out some promising approaches to
addressing jointly identified needs. They may be supported by a variety of
external resource persons with expertise in the social, managerial, and
related technical sciences. In this process of exploration and
experimentation, errors will be common, and the resource inputs will be
high relative to results. It is assumed that rapid adaptive action will be
taken as errors in initial assumptions are identified ... As insights are
gained into what to do, attention is redirected to learning how to do it
more efficiently, eliminating activities that are relatively nonproductive
and working out simplified problem-solving routines so that less-skilled
people are able to handle critical activities. Local teams (leaders as well as
professionals) are identified, and training and education is provided to
enable them to take over and run the organizations once established.
(Kurien, 2007: 46)
By combining a locally embedded presence with social bridges, Milma was able to both
provide and institutionalize the venture scripts necessary for successful and growing
dairy businesses.
Dastkar

According to the All India Artisans and Craftworkers Welfare Association, 30
million Indians are currently involved in the crafitmaking industry. However, the majority
of these individuals are not able to rise above a subsistence standard of living (AIACA,
2013). Delhi-based NGO Dastkar is a society for “crafts and craftspeople” which was
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established in 1981 by six women working in the crafts sector. The main goal of Dastkar
is helping rural women who have the skills and experience with traditional crafts to be
able to utilize them as a means of earning income and “economic self-sufficiency.”
Dastkar is helping poor craftspeople throughout the production process by identifying
skills and creating awareness of the potential of those skills in both craftsperson and
consumer. They assist participants in leveraging their skills by developing, designing,
pricing, and then marketing their work. Dastkar supports over 250 village groups
(Dastkar, 2014).
With regards to bridging social capital, Dastkar provided its members with access
to trade specific specialists, outside information regarding market trends, and access to
both domestic and international markets which were formerly outside their reach. Most
craftspeople in India struggle because the social divide between themselves and urban
clientele leaves them with little information on the market’s taste. For this reason, many
of the designers, especially in rural places, were unable to sell their goods on
consignment. Prior to Dastkar’s intervention, their markets were either nonexistent or all
but dried up. Exacerbating the situation, acquiring loans was an issue because without
any incoming contracts, they had no money for purchasing materials (Lewis, 2011).
Tyabji, the group’s founder, wanted to construct an organization which would link
grassroots producers with urban consumers (Lewis, 2011). Therefore, Dastkar first
provided craftsmakers with information about domestic and international tastes and then
connected those producers with wealthy markets and urban consumers (Lewis, 2011).
Dastkar achieved these goals primarily by providing information, expertise, and
instruction about both products and markets. This is information that the poor previously
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had no access to due to cognitive institutional constraints imposed by culture, geography,
and/or poor infrastructure. “The idea that they could slightly change their products and
make them into something that someone from the city would buy was a very novel idea”
(Lewis, 2011). Further, Hands on Dastkar, a private company in the Dastkar group,
undertakes special export orders or on behalf of smaller groups related to Dastkar. It also
provides consultancies encouraging the crafts groups to export directly to international
markets (Dastkar, 2014).
In addition to providing bridging social capital, Dastkar is also a deeply
embedded organization. They locate community groups around India and spend a full
year demonstrating best practices in creating a craft making venture that produces highly
marketable items. They generally focus on 8 to 10 new groups each year and facilitate
their navigation of the production and marketing process. Once the groups are mature and
“self-sufficient,” after several years, Dastkar directs its supportive focus to others. In
order for its craftspeople to be competitive, Dastkar spends months training them in the
design, diversification, proper production, and appropriate means of distribution for their
products for an entire year (Dastkar, 2014). While in Rathambore for a year, Dastkar
found the area’s only block printer and began paying him to train others in the technique.
One woman who learned this new skill — a skill previously unknown in her community,
— described how she was able to pay for her children’s education and allow them to
bathe every day rather than just once per week (Lewis, 2011).
EEOs, like Milma and Dastkar, which transfer entrepreneurial expertise via social
bridges and locally embed themselves in subsistence contexts, are successful because
they facilitate the transfer of best practices; thus venture scripts can be both diffused and
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entrenched. This process seems to be slowly institutionalizing a culture of entrepreneurial
expertise at the regional level.

2.5 DISCUSSION
In previous literature, research on venture scripts focused on their outcomes and
broader institutional antecedents, typically within a developed-economy context
(Mitchell et al. 2000; Lim et al. 2010). I propose a new way of looking at the institutionventure script relationship and argue that venture scripts can function as informal proto
institutions that can enable new venture success within subsistence economies. The
network-based means by which EEOs provides expert venture scripts to increase venture
quality in subsistence economies is the central thesis of this study and a primary
contribution to the literature.
Relatedly, a second contribution is my exploration of how a lack of expert venture
scripts constitutes an institutional void and how those voids might be addressed by EEOs.
I argue that institutional voids not only include the provision of financial resources,
intellectual property protection, and regulatory certainties, but they also include failure to
provide expertise needed for productive entrepreneurship. Recent work shows that
informal institutions are likely more powerful that formal institutions in providing
property protection (Williamson & Kerekes, 2011). Organizations seeking to be
entrepreneurial must attempt to institutionalize informal institutions conducive to the
development of new ventures. For EEOs to thrive and achieve their objectives, the proper
social dimensions, social bridges and local embeddedness, must be in place. Accordingly,
I contribute to the literature on the establishment of proto-institutions in contexts where
regulated market-based economic transactions are counter-institutional.

41
Contributions to the International Business Literature
The field of international business is fundamentally interested in understanding
how the domestic and/or international context influences firm behaviors and outcomes
(Shenkar, 2004). In this study, I focus on international entrepreneurship, which spans two
research domains: (1) entrepreneurship across national borders, and (2) comparative
entrepreneurship (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000). This study contributes to both domains.
Specifically, it contributes both to a better understanding of entrepreneurship as it is
practiced in subsistence and developing economies, and also to an understanding of how
international organizations (i.e., EEOs) transfer knowledge and capabilities across large
institutional divides to entrepreneurs.
Currently, we know much more about the antecedents and outcomes of
entrepreneurial ventures in developed economies than in emerging and subsistence
economies (McDougall & Oviatt, 2000) because the vast majority of previous research
has presumed an institutional context that does not exist in those contexts (Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). This study helps address this shortcoming of the
international entrepreneurship literature by offering a more complete perspective on how
and when entrepreneurship unfolds within economies where poverty is endemic.
Recent work in comparative entrepreneurship (Danis, De Clercq, & Petricevic,
2011; De Clercq, Danis, & Dahkli, 2010) indicates that social networks are far more
important in entrepreneurs’ efforts to start new businesses in weaker institutional
environments and lower income countries than in developed contexts. This model, which
focuses on EEOs, parallels those models but emphasizes the importance of social bridges
and local embeddedness in solving the issues created by institutional voids. By focusing
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on these two social capital variables separately, this study provides a clearer
understanding of the roles that individual’s and organization’s different network
connections play in the entrepreneurship process. While past studies have postulated a
substitution effect of strong institutions or networks (Danis et al., 2011), I propose that
strong social networks can in fact help EEOs construct the genesis of an institutional
framework, i.e. proto-institutions, that is supportive of new venture activity.
Furthermore, the model describes that networks’ effects go beyond access to
resources and a source of legitimacy; but instead, they give local entrepreneurs exposure
to and experience with key entrepreneurial cognitions, expert venture scripts. Research
on the generation of expert venture scripts is important for both individual entrepreneurs
and EEOs, including even large, for-profit organizations like MNEs operating there.
Understanding how expert venture script allow entrepreneurship to unfold in these
contexts can help these organizations be effectively entrepreneurial.
Second, this study contributes an understanding of the benefits of even small
organizations bridging actors in multiple contexts in order to create value for
organizations and individuals. Past work on knowledge transfer has primarily focused on
large MNEs (i.e. Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; Buckley, Clegg, & Tan,
2006). Some of this research has focused on how MNEs and NGOs can partner together
to cocreate value in subsistence economies (Brugmann & Prahalad, 2007; London &
Hart, 2004; London, 2008; Ramaswamy, 2009). However, the theory and cases presented
here are applicable to a wide variety of EEOs. Particularly, this study clarifies how
organizations focusing on entrepreneurship, knowledge, and technology transfer to
developing and emerging economies can become more effective.
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In general, knowledge transfer to markets operating with relatively low
technology levels can be difficult (Dayasindhu, 2002). Moreover, NGOs and smaller
EEOs face an added challenge because they often lack both the resources and technical
skills that MNEs have in abundance. By focusing on social connections and interactions,
I show how these constraints can be overcome. Even small EEOs, like Dastkar, can
create a good degree of value with their social bridges to other markets so long as they
are locally embedded (Saxenian, 2006). Similarly, Dastkar, Milma and other EEOs like
them are able to use their connection to other markets in order to facilitate the
internationalization process of new ventures. Learning process triggered by EEOs’
international initiatives gradually leads to innovation and knowledge spill-over that can
contribute to economy-wide growth over time (Robson, Haugh, & Obeng, 2009).
A final contribution to the international business literature is the refined and
expanded notion o f how capability enhancement can be accomplished in developing
economies. Among policymakers, traditional “top down” foreign aid is a popular
prescription for poverty and its ills. However, foreign aid is often misplaced and can
create dependency (Easterly, 2006). Moreover, reforms that only focus on problems with
financial institutions like microfinance are also likely missing the mark.
The scale o f the microfmance industry is enormous. In India alone, there were
over 150 micro-finance institutions with 25 million borrowers holding 4.5 billion dollars
in loans in 2009 (Vyas & Raman, 2012), with the overall micro-financing industry
continuing to grow. However, the last decade has shown that capital access alone may not
be enough (Banerjee et al., 2009). Once viewed as a market-based institution that could
channel capital to individuals shut out from traditional banking and financing services,
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microfinance has met with substantial criticism concerning both misallocation of
resources and the indebtedness it places on individuals (Kamani, 2007; Bateman, 2010;
Bateman & Chang, 2012). It remains unclear whether the new venture activity stemming
from microloans results high growth entrepreneurship or simply more self-employed
subsistence activities.
In contrast, I advocate an approach that provides prospective entrepreneurs the
opportunity to develop their own capabilities, increasing self-sufficiency and
independence from outside assistance. Consistent with recent findings from Africa
(Bradley, et al. 2012), I argue that EEOs, including microfinance institutions, should
focus their efforts on improving entrepreneurial expertise. Investment in the capacity of
local entrepreneurs does not necessarily have to be large to create substantial benefits
(London & Hart, 2004). Further, the most successful outsider initiated businesses
targeting entrepreneurs in subsistence economies utilize training programs for
entrepreneurs or identified opportunities by combining knowledge from both outside and
inside the local context (London & Hart, 2004).
We suggest that an important way that this occurs is by EEOs providing expert
venture scripts via the use of social bridges and local embeddedness. By bridging
international actors, the EEO becomes a channel for the flow of information, capabilities,
and financial resources that aid in the formation of expert venture scripts. Milma, for
instance, effectively targeted a low-income market by bridging local distributors with
customers. Milma spanned both geographic and social chasms between actors by
providing script-enhancing advisory assistance and training that revolutionized the
inefficient practices by both farmers and intermediaries.
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Venture Quality in Subsistence Economies
Banerjee and Duflo (2007) described typical self-employment in subsistence
economies as follows:
Being an entrepreneur is often easier than finding an employer with a job
to offer. You buy some fruits and vegetables or some plastic toys at the
wholesalers and start selling them on the street; you make some extra dosa
mix and sell the dosas in front of your house; you collect cow dung and
dry it to use it as a fuel; you attend to one cow and collect the milk. These
types of activities are exactly those in which the poor are involved
(Baneijee & Duflo, 2007: 16).
Such activities do little to generate jobs for others and thus proliferates petty
entrepreneurship. By examining entrepreneurship in subsistence contexts where necessity
entrepreneurship is the normal mode, another aspect of expert venture scripts becomes
particularly important: they aid in the quality of new ventures as well as their quantity
(Mitchell et al., 2009). As these societies gain expert venture scripts they can begin to
grow businesses beyond a subsistence status, resulting in increased human capital and
growth potential.
EEOs that do not provide entrepreneurial expertise may engender “false positive”
creation decisions, leaving individuals in deep debt with no viable business and
jeopardizing their family’s wellbeing. Since they are already living hand to mouth, a
failed business venture will threaten their existence (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007).
Microfmance by itself does not solve these issues. Many microfmance institutions
evaluate, on some level, the business plans submitted for potential loans. But they do not
help improve them or guide the entrepreneur as he tries to exploit it without the proper
knowledge, and they certainly do not institutionalize entrepreneurial expertise.
Oftentimes, loans burden entrepreneurs with large amounts of debt without a clear idea
how to tailor and exploit their business model. The model suggests that EEOs that do not
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provide access to new markets or information, and who are not deeply involved with
nascent entrepreneurs as they implement their new venture will promulgate ventures of
low quality. I believe that examining the quality o f ventures is an appropriate prism for
evaluating EEOs impact.
Limitations and Future Research
We primarily address the context of subsistence economies, where expert venture
scripts and high growth entrepreneurship are less common, due to the lack of supportive
formal institutions and the high cost of failure. Therefore, the model of EEOs’ generation
of scripts is limited to those regions where they are in relatively short supply.
Additionally, it is limited to regions where the staying power of EEOs is credible because
unrest and violence diminishes their ability to connect entrepreneurs with markets. If
potential entrepreneurs cannot trust the EEO’s stability because they fear it will be
subsumed by turmoil and chaos, there will be no local buy-in. At the same time, volatility
should not be seen as prohibitively pervasive in most subsistence economies.
Although many subsistence economies are less stable than more developed
nations, global conflict has been substantially reduced since 1990 (Center fo r Systemic
Peace, 2013). So such caveats likely only apply to extremely volatile regions such as
Sudan and Afghanistan and do not mean that EEOs must have exceptionally stable
ground on which to work. If the trend towards broader global peace continues, EEOs’
role will also expand.
One limitation of this study is that it does not examine the possibility or the
consequences of the notion that individuals in subsistence economies may have welldeveloped expert scripts for “unproductive” entrepreneurial practices (Baumol, 1996;
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Minniti, 2008). When I argue that subsistence economies do not have expert venture
scripts, I am referring to scripts for productive entrepreneurship. By focusing on scripts
associated with productive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1996), I highlight the types of
knowledge structures that lead to economic growth and development. Legal market-based
activities require a different set of skills than underground and illegal forms of
entrepreneurship. In the latter situation entrepreneurs seek to exploit poor institutions
(Webb, Tihanyi, Sirmon, & Ireland, 2009), while in the former situation, individuals
strive to build upon strong institutions.
Future research should focus on more micro-level topics in attempting to uncover
the processes by which EEOs can best establish bridging social capital and local
embeddedness. The model I present is somewhat static and mainly describes the
characteristics of an EEO capable of providing expert venture scripts but does not inform
as to how it gained these characteristics. Perhaps, research in the broader
entrepreneurship literature concerning building legitimacy and building social networks
can better inform this discussion. Such an understanding will likely involve field work
and grounded theory building.
The in-depth look at the processes institutional entrepreneurs used in creating
inclusive markets by Mair et al. (2012) could serve as a prototype for the ethnographic
shape that future research in this area should take. However, any research method that
gains insight into how beneficial institutional forms emerge in subsistence economies
should be encouraged. The poor in these regions suffer many hardships and deserve the
attention of entrepreneurship and organizational scholars in addressing those challenges.
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We have argued that new ventures will be far less likely to be transformative and
successful without the appropriate expert venture scripts. EEOs have become
increasingly prevalent and can help institutionalize venture scripts via bridging social
capital and local embeddedness. I contribute to the literature by expanding inquiry into
the practice and results of institutional entrepreneurship in subsistence economies. In
doing so, I have contributed to research on the establishment of entrepreneurial expertise
in settings characterized by weak institutions, by expanding understanding of the use of
proto-institutions. Further, I add context to the International Business literature’s
understanding of not just entrepreneurship, but knowledge transfer as well.
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CHAPTER 3
ESSAY II: A SET-THEORETIC EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL BUSINESS
SYSTEMS, ENTREPRENEURIAL CULTURE, AND OPPORTUNITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
3.1 ABSTRACT
Opportunity entrepreneurship is the process of creating a business for the primary
purpose of exploiting a perceived opening in the market for the pursuit of profit. To
explore how the institutional environment is linked to opportunity entrepreneurship, I
examine each of 45 countries’ multi-faceted national business systems (Whitley, 1999) in
combination with its entrepreneurial culture (consisting of risk-taking, proactiveness,
need for achievement, and innovativeness). I take a set-theoretic approach and construct
configurations (i.e. bundles) of country-level institutions associated with various levels of
opportunity entrepreneurship. The analysis identifies four different configurations
sufficient for high levels of opportunity entrepreneurship and three configurations
associated with low levels of opportunity entrepreneurship. These results suggests that
there are actually several equifmal ways for societies to foster impactful entrepreneurship
using national business systems in combination with an entrepreneurial culture. Further,
it suggests that those institutions behave interdependently and synergistically to produce
opportunity entrepreneurship.
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3.2 INTRODUCTION
The ascendant economic growth paradigm posits that economies develop via the
expansion of knowledge (Romer, 1993; Jones, 1995). Individuals and organizations
create new knowledge by making it possible to combine inputs in valuable and novel
ways (Schumpeter, 1934; Galunic & Rodan, 1998). Innovation processes like research
and development, scientific discovery, and organic learning processes lead to
technological change, generating new or less costly production possibilities. However,
this expansion of knowledge does not automatically lead to development. Once
innovators produces new combinations, they need to be applied in order to reduce costs
of production, reach unreached markets, or even produce goods and services that are
completely new and original. This is precisely where the entrepreneur steps in
(Holcombe, 1998).
With this role in mind, Kirzner (1978, 1997) describes entrepreneurs as alert
individuals who have the ability to recognize market or technological sea change. These
individuals are in a better position to spot opportunities due to some specialized expertise
and/or prior market knowledge (see also Shane, 2000). For example, “Those with training
in mechanical engineering are more likely to spot potential profit opportunities in the
design of the internal combustion engine than those with training in law ... People who
travel a lot might notice opportunities because the amenities they find in one place might
not be available in another” (Holcombe, 1998:49). The key role of the entrepreneur in
both these situations is that of one who recognizes and begins to exploit emerging
opportunities. Opportunity entrepreneurship is the process of creating a business for the
primary purpose of exploiting perceived market inefficiencies for the pursuit of profit.
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Opportunity entrepreneurship plays an instrumental role in fostering societal economic
development and efficiency (Van Praag & Versloot, 2007).
In places “where institutions produce a net benefit to productive opportunities,
(e.g., arbitrage and innovation), entrepreneurs will exploit those opportunities resulting in
the creation of wealth” (Coyne & Boettke, 2009). However, these net benefits are not
universal. Entrepreneurial activities, including opportunity entrepreneurship, exhibit
significant disparities both across countries and over time (Rees & Shah, 1986;
Blanchflower, 2000; De Wit and Van Winden, 1989). A healthy stream of research has
linked differences in institutional contexts to entrepreneurship outcomes (e.g. Aldrich &
Waldinger, 1990; Thornton, 1999; Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; Spencer &
Gomez, 2004;; Hwang & Powell, 2005; Bowen & De Clercq, 2007; Lim, Morse, Mitchell
& Seawright, 2010; Puffer, McCarthy & Boisot, 2010; Stenholm, Acs, & Wuebker, 2013;
Valdez & Richardson, 2013).
In this paper, I put forth both a theoretical and methodological alternative to these
recent approaches. While linear thinking may engender understanding of which
institutional components are most important on average, they ignore the possibilities of
both conjunctural causation and equifinality (multiple equilibria). Conjunctural causation
means that the sufficiency of any one institutional aspect may work best in combination
with the others such that interrelationships among causes matter a great deal. Equifinality
implies that there may be multiple institutional profiles capable of producing high levels
of opportunity entrepreneurship. If this is indeed the case, a set-theoretic approach is
highly appropriate because set-theoretic methodologies ae uniquely tailored to capture
both of these ideas. With this alternative conceptualization in mind, I use fuzzy-set
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qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2000; Fiss, 2007) to investigate the
following research question: How does Whitley’s (1999) conceptualization of the
national business system combine with entrepreneurial culture to produce opportunity
entrepreneurship?
Whitley (1999) identified four broad societal elements that coalesce together and
influence economic activities such as entrepreneurship: These elements include three
regulative elements: the financial system, education and skill development, the
government and its codified regulations, and one informal/cultural element: trust and
authority relations. Each element shapes and is shaped by other institutions. Over time,
these seemingly distinct elements coalesce into the holistic institutional bundles that
shape economic behaviors. While Whitley (1999) did include one informal cultural
element, trust and power relations, past work has shown that certain societies have a
distinctly entrepreneurial culture involving need for achievement, proactiveness, risk
taking, creativity, and innovation (Lee & Peterson, 2001). Therefore, to Whitley’s
national business system, I theorize that an entrepreneurial cultural dimension is also
relevant for understanding entrepreneurial outcomes.
Results of the study support the methodology and the notions of conjunctural
causation and equifinality in the relationship between institutions and opportunity
entrepreneurship. Thus, the results make several contributions to the institutions and
entrepreneurship literatures. First, results indicate that Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (fsQCA) does improve understanding of how institutions combine with one
another to influence opportunity entrepreneurship. It does so by allowing for the
identification of several institutional bundles that enable individuals to start meaningful
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and growth-oriented businesses. Second, results indicate that different combinations of
national business system elements and entrepreneurial culture exhibit equifinality,
combining in different ways and yet yielding high levels of opportunity entrepreneurship.
This analysis identifies three such bundles. Finally, I contribute to a growing body of
research that explores the type rather than simply the rate of entrepreneurship (e.g.
Bowen & De Clercq, 2007; Khoury, Webb & Prasad, 2013; Stenholm, et al., 2013). As
scholars continue to examine entrepreneurship at the macro-level, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that total entrepreneurial activity should not be policymakers’
primary focus. Focusing on innovation or opportunity entrepreneurship is likely a far
more relevant research agenda.
3.3

THEORY DEVELOPMENT

Opportunity Entrepreneurship
Past research has conceptualized and measured entrepreneurial phenomena in
several different ways. Among these are rates of innovation (e.g. Shane, 1993), small
business ownership (Hofstede, Noorderhaven, Thurik, Uhlaner, Wennekers & Wildeman,
2004), and high growth entrepreneurship (e.g. Bowen & De Clercq, 2007). Opportunity
entrepreneurship is the focus of this paper. As outlined above, opportunity
entrepreneurship is the process of creating a business for the primary purpose of
exploiting a perceived market inefficiency for the pursuit of profit. It is a reaction to
"those situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods
can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production” (Singh, 2001: 220).
Particularly in developing economies, the incidence of self-described
entrepreneurs is quite high. However, this is generally due to self-employment in

68
subsistence activities rather than participation in high growth entrepreneurship (Banerjee
& Duflo, 2007; Bowen & De Clercq, 2007). Many self-employed individuals in these
markets become entrepreneurs because they perceive no other options for employment or
because of cultural-cognitive barriers imposed by environmental conditions.
Additionally, they often have very few skills and startup capital. In contrast, opportunity
entrepreneurship is not passively engaging in intergenerational subsistence activities, but
it is an active choice to begin a new venture based on the perception that an unexploited
or underexploited business opportunity exists or can be created. Necessity
entrepreneurship has little effect on economic development and can even serve to
fossilize economic activity such that change cannot take place. However, opportunity
entrepreneurship has a positive and significant effect (Acs & Varga, 2005; Acs, 2006).
Therefore, I examine opportunity entrepreneurship due to its relevance for economic
'y

growth and development.
The National Business System, Entrepreneurial Culture, and Entrepreneurial
Outcomes
Institutional theory examines the rules, behavioral norms, values, and dominant
thinking patterns that categorize societies as collections of economic actors (Fang, 2010).
Due to their importance and ubiquity, scholars can “understand entrepreneurship research
and practice more fully by finding out what was institutionalized, that is, which activities,
beliefs, and attitudes have come to acquire taken-for-granted or rule-like status (and
which ones have not). These salient institutions, in turn, enable and constrain

2 Acs & Varga (2005) provide a full discussion differentiating opportunity entrepreneurship from other
types and exploring its’ consequences.
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entrepreneurial activities (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010).” Institutional theory turns
attention away from individual characteristics towards the market and environmental
institutions in which they operate (Thornton, 1999). Societies either formally codify or
tacitly approve institutions. Institutions include both concrete objects and resources as
well as verbal and social activities (Valdez & Richardson, 2013). Institutions can alter the
rate of new venture creation as well as venture size and potential (Gnyawali & Fogel,
1994; Hwang & Powell, 2005).
In this study, I follow Bowen and De Clercq (2007) and use Whitley’s (1999)
national business system framework to examine the configurational effects of each
society’s national business system in combination with entrepreneurial culture. Whitley
(1999: 47) recognized four broad national institutional components influencing the nature
of actors’ economic activities: These are (1) the financial system, (2) education and skill
development, (3) the government and its codified regulations, and (4) trust/authority
relations. I argue that a society’s level of opportunity entrepreneurship will be related to
the accessibility of financial capital for new ventures; the degree to which its skill
development system focuses on entrepreneurship; the degree to which the state’s legal
framework supports entrepreneurship as evidenced by the regulatory ease for launching
new ventures due to policies of the state, and the state’s protection of property; and,
finally, the degree to which the society maintains trust relations through control of
corruption (Bowen & De Clercq, 2007).
In addition to the national business system, I posit that entrepreneurial culture is
an additional crucial element. Though Whitley (1999) did include one informal cultural
element, trust and power relations, past work has shown how some countries have a
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distinctly entrepreneurial culture involving need for achievement, proactiveness, risk
taking, creativity, and innovation (e.g. Thomas & Mueller, 2000; Lee & Peterson, 2001;
Mueller & Thomas, 2001; Beugelsdijk, 2007). Therefore, to Whitley’s national business
system, I theorize that an entrepreneurial cultural dimension is also highly relevant for
understanding entrepreneurial outcomes. Examinations of culture in driving
entrepreneurial phenomena has met with mixed results, implying a complex and nuanced
relationship between culture and entrepreneurship (Noorderhaven, Wennekers, Hofstede,
Thurik, and Wildeman, 1999). In this study, I postulate that mixed findings may occur
because the national business system interacts with entrepreneurial culture’s influence on
entrepreneurship in multiple ways.
Elements of the National Business System
Capital Availability
The availability of financial resources for the founding of new businesses is vital
for entrepreneurs. Such funding sources include banks, equity, government subsidies, and
venture capitalists. Past work has shown that the availability of financial resources
positively influences the new venture creation activity (Levie & Autio, 2008). Financial
capital for nascent entrepreneurs could consist of capital from informal investors (Szerb,
Rappai, Makra, & Teijesen, 2007), established venture capital firms (Deeds, Mang, &
Frandsen, 2004), or banking institutions (Cetorelli & Strahan, 2006). It is therefore
critical for a society to possess a financial infrastructure that understands and actively
seek to satisfy the particular requirements of scalable entrepreneurial ventures (De
Clercq, Lim & Oh, 2013).
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Prior work shows that entrepreneurs’ ability to acquire funding in order to be able
to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship differs by country (Bygrave, Hay, Ng, &
Reynolds, 2003). Primarily, the extent that the financial system affects opportunity
entrepreneurship hinges on the society’s financial liquidity. Generally, equity-based
financial systems tend to allow funds to flow towards new ventures far more freely than
debt-based systems. Under debt-based systems in which banks are the primary actors,
financial capital is often provided to new ventures at higher interest rates (Whitley,
1999). In such cases, the cost of forming a new business may be prohibitive. Thus, in
societies in which financial capital is more affordably available to new ventures,
opportunity entrepreneurship will be more likely to flourish.
Skill Development System
The skill development system is another important aspect of the national business
system that affects entrepreneurs (Whitley, 1999). Societies that possess a high quality
skill development system for opportunity entrepreneurship provide good preparation for
starting up and growing new ventures. Whitley embraced the role of practical instruction
of adults for business occurring through the combination of post-secondary educational
institutions and businesses. Experiences provided by post-secondary educational
institutions can enhance people’s career choices.
The skill development system contributes to opportunity entrepreneurship by
imparting autonomy and self-efficacy, informing career choices, and providing
understanding of markets, business transactions, social trends and demands and what
constitutes legitimate market opportunities (Reynolds, Hay and Camp, 1999; Verheul,
Wennekers, Audretsch, and Thurik, 2002). A country’s skill development system can
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promote opportunity entrepreneurship (i.e. improve the nature and quantity of
entrepreneurial activity) by helping to engender market-based psychological schema,
improving the perceived social standing of entrepreneurs, and developing basic
entrepreneurial skills (Gavron, Cowling, Holtham, and Westall, 1998). Furthermore,
characteristics needed for opportunity entrepreneurship like innovativeness and risk
taking can be fostered (Van der Kuip, 1998). Indeed, post-secondary educational
environments can build students’ business acumen, especially by offering
entrepreneurship courses (OECD, 1998). In these ways, a country’s skill development
system can enhance opportunity entrepreneurship (Bowen & De Clercq, 2007).
Government
Past work has identified two key aspects of government that is linked to advanced
entrepreneurial outcomes: regulator burden and property rights (Bowen & De Clercq,
2007). In this study, the regulatory ease of launching new ventures refers to lower costs
and fewer government regulations associated with new venture creation. In order to
engage in opportunity entrepreneurship, several legal hurdles must be cleared (Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). These costs and demands vary by country
(Klapper, Laevan, & Rajan, 2006). Such barriers dissuade people from transitioning into
opportunity entrepreneurship, even if they believe that they likely have a viable business
model idea.
While established businesses can devote personnel and resources to dealing with
government regulations, new ventures may struggle to meet and comply with these
administrative costs. Such activities divert attention from the business model, and in the
early stages of new ventures, time is of the essence. Additionally, a complex regulatory
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environment hinders firm growth and the exploitation process. Some entrepreneurs may
decide not to make new hires due to legal obligations and red tape (Niehof, 1999).
Unclear legislation may also result in high transaction costs (Verheul et al., 2002).
For instance, when different government levels and agencies do not consistently use the
same jargon to describe equivalent concepts it creates confusion. In these countries,
individuals wishing to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship may not understand
government codes and stipulations. Verheul et al., (2002: 32) notes that in many cases,
policymakers change tax systems frequently and at multiple government levels.
Oftentimes, the codes can be difficult to understand. At the extreme, in places like the
former French colonies in Africa, government complexity can be absolutely crippling to
opportunity entrepreneurs wishing to participate in the formal economy (Djankov et al.,
2001).Burdensome regulations involve time, money, and effort from the entrepreneur in
order to meet the requirements (Verheul et al., 2002). Overall, individuals will be far less
likely to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship where regulations complicate and add
costs to the entrepreneurship process.
Another important aspect of Whitley’s (1999) frameworks subsumed under
government is property rights protection. Property rights are government regulations
stipulating how individuals can control, benefit from and transfer property. In societies in
which property rights are protected, individuals are able to capitalize on proprietary
assets. A fair and transparent judicial system allows for the preservation and protection of
private property. (Johnson McMillan, & Woodruff, 2002) It further promotes a society
wide recognition of the importance of safeguarded transactions. This, in turn, encourages
market participation and risk taking at a level that can support the actions required for
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opportunity entrepreneurship. Particularly important for opportunity entrepreneurs is the
ability to exploit one’s own intellectual property. Intellectual property, the idea at the
core of the business model, is the central impetus for innovativeness and, consequently,
transformative opportunity entrepreneurship.
Empirical evidence has shown that people more readily exploit new and
innovative ideas in the marketplace when there are strong intellectual property right
protections in place (Sobel, 2008). In society’s lacking the basic protections, any
opportunity that entrepreneurs believe they perceive may not be real since it could easily
be poached or duplicated before the innovator is able to collect entrepreneurial rents. In
these societies, would be opportunity-driven entrepreneurs may be reluctant to invest
their savings into capital (physical or human) formation activities (Johnson et al., 2002).
History bears out this lesson. For centuries in China, for instance, the legal system could
not and did not enforce contracts and entrepreneurship consequently suffered (Baumol,
1990). McMullen, Bagby, & Palich (2008), among others, have shown that the property
rights-entrepreneurship relationship still holds true with cross-country data from 36
countries. Given both theory and accumulated empirical evidence, it is right to conclude
that a society’s property rights protections influence individuals’ ability and willingness
to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship. In societies with strong property rights,
individuals believe that the rule of law will protect and preserve their entrepreneurial
efforts and creative actions.
Trust Relations and the Control o f Corruption
Whitley (1994, 1999) describes how entrepreneurial behavior is strongly linked to
the reliability or trustworthiness of its citizens and organizations. Trust refers to the
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reliance on the integrity of others within society. It generally denotes confidence in the
certainty of future payment for goods and services received. In the national business
system, trust plays a key role complementing other societal institutions. Formal
institutions cannot be successful unless parties can set up a working trusting relationship
in which individuals have faith in both the dependability o f transactions as well as the
enforcement of the appropriate penalties when necessary. Trust allows for reliable
connections between strangers and the creation of both social and business groups
(Welter & Smallbone, 2006). As a relationship-enhancer, it is particularly important
where property rights and other legal regulations are not strictly enforced. In these cases,
corruption and opportunistic behavior rises. In situations in which legal regulations are
imperfectly enforced, trust decreases transaction costs by increasing information flow and
safeguarding contracts. In this way, societal trust reduces the likelihood of corruption.
(Welter & Smallbone, 2006).
Corruption is characteristic of societies that lack trust. It is, in many ways, the
inverse of trust (Uslaner, 2004). Corruption consists of unethical activities like bribing
public officials, breaking a contract, or privately appropriating gains that are not one’s
own (Choi & Thum, 2005). Societal corruption reinforces itself through repeated
corrosive and unethical interactions with other actors, which weakens beliefs about their
reliability. Thus, trust is eroded where corruption is prevalent. Repeated transaction
patterns and experiences throughout society determine whether trust OR corruption
becomes institutionalized at a national level (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). Consequently,
national business systems vary to the degree in which corruption is manifested.
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In corrupt societies, individuals wishing to invest in a venture seeking to exploit a
market opportunity face a substantial risk that suppliers and customers will behave
opportunistically, appropriating profits that the entrepreneurship should be entitled
(Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). Opportunity entrepreneurship, the desire to create a scalable,
growing business requires more commitment and risk than subsistence activities. Thus,
corruption is particularly harmful to individuals wishing to engage in opportunity
entrepreneurship.
Indeed, past work shows that the presence of trust leads to the absence of
corruption, increasing activities central to opportunity entrepreneurship like innovation
(Dakhli & De Clercq, 2004). Widespread corruption restricts resource accumulation and
recombination (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Because corruption is particularly damaging to
the sophisticated transactions and activities needed for opportunity entrepreneurship. I
argue that a country’s level of corruption limits the degree to which individuals are
willing to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship. Thus, corruption erodes entrepreneurs’
valuations of potential opportunities because uncertain payoffs reduce the number of both
perceived and real opportunities. Conversely, when individuals objectively evaluate
opportunities, risks associated with corruption become negligible, and opportunities
become observable and real for entrepreneurs to act on. In sum, a country’s corruption
levels decreases opportunity entrepreneurship by reducing the number of true,
exploitable, and observable opportunities.
Entrepreneurial Culture
Culture is the collection of shared values, beliefs and norms of a group or
community (Basu & Altinay, 2002). Hoftstede (1991, p.5) famously defines culture as “a

77
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or
category of people from another.” Exploration of linkages between culture and economic
initiative dates back at least as far as Weber’s (1904) work on the Protestant ethic.
Weber’s manifesto fed a stream of entrepreneurship literature focused on the traits of
individual entrepreneurs. This line of research argues that cultural contexts help form
individual interpretations and beliefs, influencing decisions such as business startups (e.g.
Shane, 1993). In this research stream, scholars have explored whether the relationships
between cultural traits and entrepreneurship phenomena are universal.
Linkages between Hofstede’s (1980) national cultural dimensions and
entrepreneurship has also been addressed in the literature. Shane (1993) found that low
power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, and high individualism increases innovation.
Their counter-intuitive finding on power distance indirectly contradicted Shane’s
country-level observations. Acs, Audretsch, and Evans (1994) added further
complications, finding that uncertainty avoidance is positively related to entrepreneurship
while individualism decreases it in their sample. Their counter-intuitive finding on power
distance contradicted Shane’s country-level observations. Noorderhaven, Wennekers,
Hofstede, Thurik and Wildeman (1999) promulgated a dissatisfaction hypothesis
(Noorderhaven et al., 1999; Hofstede et al., 2004) to explain the contradictory findings.
They speculated that dissatisfaction with existing organizational culture pushes
individuals into self-employment.
Given problems with Hofstede’s program at assessing entrepreneurial culture, I
utilize a more direct approach to assessing culture’s impact on entrepreneurship. For
instance, Thomas and Mueller (2000) examined cultural variation in entrepreneurship
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traits such as innovativeness, locus of control, and risk taking. Additionally, Lynn (1991)
linked variation in cultural competiveness to business ownership rates. Other scholars
have examined how the culture of a social class or ethnic group impacts entrepreneurship
(Aldrich & Waldinger, 1990; Light & Rosenstein 1995). Reynolds, Hay, & Camp (1999)
found some evidence that positive attitudes about entrepreneurs are correlated with the
founding of new firms, and that negative judgments towards failed entrepreneurs
diminishes the startup rate. Additionally, Wennekers, Uhlaner, and Thurik (2002) suggest
that positive social attitudes about entrepreneurship lead to individual level support,
increasing the supply of entrepreneurs in a given society. Most recently, Valdez and
Richardson’s (2013) used perceptual data from entrepreneurs to assess societal views of
entrepreneurs. Results of that study indicated that the linkage between entrepreneurship
and a culture that values the traits associated with new venture creation was a strong
indicator for entrepreneurial outcomes.
Accordingly, in this study, I argue that in addition to the key cultural elements in
Whitley’s conceptualization of the national business system (i.e. trust and authority
relations), a thriving entrepreneurial culture is also a key element. Such a culture
includes elements of proactiveness, risk-taking, need for achievement, innovation, and
creativity. Below, I argue that entrepreneurial culture, along with Whitley’s dimensions
both shape and are shaped by one another. In some cases they combine to form societies
conducive to opportunity entrepreneurship, while in other cases they do not.
A Configurational Approach to the National Business System and Entrepreneurial
Culture
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I argue for a gestalt or configurational approach to understanding national
contexts for entrepreneurship. Such a conceptualization has strong theoretical backing in
the institutional theory literature. For instance, Holmes, Miller, Hitt and Salmador (2013),
found evidence that institutions are interdependent. They highlighted how cultural and
informal institutions determine formal institutional elements. They showed that formal
institutions, once established, are stable however, their establishment is highly dependent
on culture. Indeed, several scholars have argued that softer institutional elements, like a
society’s culture, may be the true determinants of development-related outcomes (la Porta
& Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000; Redding, 2005; Jackson & Deeg, 2008). DiMaggio and
Powell (1991) described culture as a society’s toolkit from which they act and draw upon
to solve social problems. Whereas cultural values and behaviors by their very nature and
definition acquire societal consent, society must view regulative elements as efficacious
solutions before they can be adopted (Powell, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1994).
History shows that when societies do not deem codified institutions efficacious,
they will discard them and new solutions will be explored (Witt & Redding, 2009). While
historical events and living conditions may be the immediate cause of such changes,
normative and cultural-cognitive characteristics play a key role in determining both the
root and the direction of the change. These elements shape a society’s view of world and
national events (Witt & Redding, 2009) and serve as a prism for interpretation (Zilber,
2006). These interpretations, in turn, lead to the development of new formal institutions
because they focus a society’s attention on a given issue (Busenitz et al., 2000),
determine the weight or value that a society places on the issue (Schwartz, 1999) and lead
to the creation of intended remedies (Witt & Redding, 2009). Regulative institutions,
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then, are often inorganic solutions that governing bodies enact to confront perceived
national problems. Therefore, regulative institutions are, in part, a reaction to normative
and cultural-cognitive elements. They reflect and encapsulate softer institutions,
codifying their preferences for society (Busenitz et al., 2000).
However, it is wrong to simply conclude that cultural elements are a direct and
exogenous antecedent of regulative elements. It is important also to consider historical
pathways (North, 1990). As regulative institutions shape global events, a society may
completely alter the way it expresses its softer institutions in reaction to the event. In fact,
culture to a large degree is determined by history. In turn, regulative elements become the
expression of cultural variables in reaction to history (Redding, 2005.) That is, regulative
institutions can spark historical events, which, in turn, lead to normative or culturalcognitive change. England’s Magna Carta altered social hierarchal relations leading to
trust and decreased power distance. Increasing social capital then led to development and
increased prosperity, feeding more normative and cultural-cognitive changes (North &
Weingast, 1989).
In spite of these complex interdependencies, to date scholars have attempted to
examine the independent effects of institutions and culture on entrepreneurship (e.g.
Busenitz et al., 2000; Spencer & Gomez, 2004; Puffer, McCarthy & Boisot, 2010;
Stenholm et al., 2013; Valdez & Richardson, 2013)). Such an approach cannot qualify or
quantify how institutions join with culture to form a bundle of mutually reinforcing, or
perhaps substitutable, components. I propose there may be multiple cultural-institutional
profiles that a country may use utilize to produce a high number of opportunity
entrepreneurs.
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One example from the literature where a holistic view would be appropriate is the
situation where government regulations are unconducive to entrepreneurship, and yet a
flourishing entrepreneurial environment still develops. In these societies, informal norms
(Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Lui, 2000) or alternative governance mechanisms (Khanna &
Palepu, 1997) may act as substitutes. The offshoot is that institutions, i.e. the national
business system, and an entrepreneurial culture are intricately wound together and have
causally ambiguous origins. The three formal elements of the national business system
and entrepreneurial culture coalesce together and influence each other. The informal
elements (trust relations and entrepreneurial culture) along with more formal elements
(financial capital availability, skill development, and government regulations and quality)
all combine together to create a social system that may or may not be conducive for
entrepreneurship.
Because the blending of institutional and cultural components is clearly such a
complex issue, there may be vast heterogeneity in countries’ profiles, leading to
qualitative and quantitative variation in activities and transactions. Countries in which
certain aspects of the national business system seem highly conducive to
entrepreneurship may struggle if other national business system components or an
entrepreneurial culture is not in place (lack of complementariness). Conversely, in other
cases, if some institutional causal conditions seem poor, this weakness can be overcome
by high levels of other elements of the national business system or entrepreneurial culture
(substitution effect). Therefore, for many country-level outcomes, national institutions
may act either in concert or as substitutes. Under this perspective, improving a given
institution may increase entrepreneurship in some settings but not in others, such that the
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marginal benefits of an improvement in any given component depends on the quality of
the other components. Furthermore, an institutional component, by itself will not
necessarily lead to opportunity entrepreneurship. For instance, policies designed to make
starting a business easier may not lead to opportunity entrepreneurship if cultural
components are resistant. Undoubtedly, these issues are complex, containing a high
degree of interdependency and endogeneity. Therefore, I put forth the following
proposition for subsequent analysis:
Core Proposition: Each of the elements of the national business system along with
entrepreneurial culture in and by itself is not a sufficient condition for high
opportunity entrepreneurship; the effectiveness of the national business system
and entrepreneurial culture depend on how they interact with each other.
3.4 METHODOLOGY
A Configurational Approach
In order for theories that approximate the complexities of many social phenomena
to emerge, scholars need to apply methods for building typologies and logical
combinatory explanations. A combinatory perspective stipulates that each institutional
facet is only one element of a complex system. The presence or absence of a given
element, or casual condition, in a complex system may be either beneficial or detrimental
to the outcome depending upon the state of the other causal conditions.
Methodological choice is not a mere matter of preference, or even perceived
appropriateness, given the theory at hand. Instead, as Delbridge and Fiss (2013) recently
argued, theorizing is tightly bound to methodology such that there is a strong and
consistent feedback loop between the two. In fact, scholarly attention to phenomena in
which the antecedents “combine, rather than compete, to bring about an outcome where
individual causes may be neither necessary nor sufficient by themselves” (Delbridge &
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Fiss, 2013, 328) and thus, undetectable to linear methods. Consistent with this
perspective, I depart from past prisms and methodologies by examining the national
business system and entrepreneurial culture as potential gestalts of different variables..
To do so, I utilize fuzzy-set theory and analysis (Fiss, 2007; Ragin, 2000). Fuzzyset analysis is a tool for uncovering complex patterns in holistic cases of data and helps in
both theory testing and theory building (Ragin, 2000; 2006; 2008). Consistent with this
method’s protocol, I used institutional theory and the entrepreneurship literature to
deductively identify the causal conditions. I then used fsQCA to determine and
inductively identify any interdependencies among these causal mechanisms, exploring
how they alternative configurations lead to equifinal entrepreneurship outcomes.
Sample
I explored archival data in order to examine a large array of countries: The sample
includes data from 45 countries in 2010. Data come from three primary sources. Data
sources include the Global Entrepreneurship M onitor’s country level data (Xavier,
Kelley, Kew, Herrington & Vorderwiilbecke, 2013). For sources and a succinct
description of each causal condition as well as the outcome variable, refer to Table 3.1.
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
One shortcoming of the institutions and entrepreneurship literature to date is that
it has generally focused on highly developed countries like the United States and Western
Europe (Thomas & Mueller, 2000; Valdez and Richardson, 2013). Thanks to the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor, The World Bank, and Hofstede’s research agenda, this study
covers 45 countries from 5 continents. Notably, a broad diversity of countries is
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represented including 7 African, 9 Asian, and 12 Latin American countries. Table 3.2
provides a full list of the countries.
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
Outcome Variable
Accurate and nuanced conceptualization and measurement of most
entrepreneurial phenomena is a major concern (Khoury, Webb & Prasad, 2013). The
primary basis for this study’s focus on opportunity entrepreneurship is the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor’s Adult Population Survey’s question for self-identified
entrepreneurs, “Are you involved in opportunity early-stage entrepreneurial activity?”
This question was one of a series of questions aimed at determining whether an
individual was engaged in necessity, lifestyle, or opportunity entrepreneurship.
Because there is a structural relationship between GDP per capita and
entrepreneurship activity (Wennekers & Thurik, 1999), I transformed the raw data from
the survey question by regressing the level of opportunity entrepreneurship in a society
on GDP per capita. By removing variance in opportunity entrepreneurship caused by
GDP per capita, I can control for this structural effect and focus on how institutions
influence it more directly. To control for their impact on the sample, I regressed
opportunity entrepreneurship on GDP per capita (2010) data from the World Bank. The
resulting residuals make up the dependent variable for the study: opportunity
entrepreneurship relative to the expected level of opportunity entrepreneurship given
GDP per capita.3

3 Note that Bowen & De Clercq (2007) attempted to deal with this problem in another way. They examined
the proportion o f entrepreneurs engaged in high growth ventures. While this approach was considered, it
invoked too large a penalty on countries that really do have a large contingent o f opportunity entrepreneurs,
even if they are greatly outnumbered by necessity and lifestyle entrepreneurs.
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Causal Conditions
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor also measures country-level
entrepreneurship variables through its National Expert Survey. The National Expert
Survey has created standardized measures of business and government experts’
perceptions of several key indicators of the country’s institutional framework for
entrepreneurship. Elements of the national business system, specifically as it relates to
entrepreneurship are measured (Bowen & De Clercq, 2007). To do so, I utilize five
causal conditions to assess Whitley’s national business system. Four of these indicators
(the financial capital availability for new venture, the skill development system’s
emphasis on entrepreneurship, property rights protections for proprietary knowledge, and
regulatory ease) are taken from the National Expert Survey. A fifth indicator control o f
corruption is drawn from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and
is used to capture trust relations. Finally, items for entrepreneurial culture are also taken
from the National Expert Survey.
The degree to which financial capital availability for new ventures can be
obtained, the extent to which the skill development system focuses on entrepreneurship,
the regulatory ease of launching new ventures, as well as property rights security of
entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurial culture, are all measured as the average of several
scores (five-point Likert scale) from the National Expert Survey. On the 2010 NES there
are six question measuring financial capital availability, six examining the skill
development system, seven measuring regulatory ease, a five investigating property
rights, and five assessing the entrepreneurial culture.
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Survey items measuring financial capital availability capture entrepreneurs’
access to funding and private equity (Reynolds et al., 1999; Bowen & De Clercq, 2007).
Items assessing the skill development system queries experts about the degree and
effectiveness to which each country's higher educational system targets entrepreneurship.
Items examining the ease of getting business licenses, the way in which the tax system
treats new ventures, and the helpfulness of government policy in helping entrepreneurs
start new ventures are captured by regulatory ease. Items assessing the degree to which
intellectual property rights, patents, and trademarks were protected were used to capture
property rights protection.
Finally, I use the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, an
average of thirteen corruption indices worldwide to examine the extent to which the
government displays corruption. Those with low corruption have high levels of trust
relations. I label this variable control o f corruption. The cumulative index measures how
corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be.
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is a combinatory technique
(Fiss, 2007; Vis, 2012), which uses Boolean algebra to generate configurations of causal
conditions and measure their relation to an outcome variable (Ragin, 2000; Ragin, Drass,
& Davey, 2006). Boolean algebra, rather than the linear algebra that OLS and other
techniques employ, allows researchers to capture set-theoretic phenomena or typologies
instead of each condition’s independent effect (Fiss, 2011; Fiss, Cambre, & Marx, 2013).
FsQCA treats each observation or case holistically. It is a valuable tool for describing and
exploring how differing pathways impact an outcome by grouping these cases based on
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the appropriate similarities and differences. According to Ragin (2006), the ability to
view cases as configurations allows researchers to study specific empirical cases while
counteracting the obscuring of cases in conventional forms of correlational cross-case
analysis. Moreover, conventional cross-case analyses may ignore multiple equilibria by
veiling case distinctions through their emphasis on the net effects of antecedents (Ragin,
2006). While most cross-case studies, attempt to maximize explained variation (e.g.
Eisenhardt, 1989), the goal o f fuzzy-set analysis is to make sense of cases with a good
degree of detail, not losing information where equifinal successful cases, perhaps, have
vast differences.
Some recent work has validated many of the analytical strengths of fsQCA for
analysis of country-level outcomes, using institutions-based causal conditions. Pajunen
(2008) showed that national configurations of institutions could be used to understand
FDI flows to a country. Greckhamer (2011) described configurations of institutions that
could increase both national compensation levels and inequality. Vis, Woldendorp, &
Kenam (2013) used fuzzy set analysis to examine 19 developed economies to
demonstrate that political institutions are interdependent and combine to influence the
macroeconomic environment. The two primary advantages of fsQCA are (1) that it
allows for the description of each case as a combination or configurations of causal
conditions, and (2) enables the exploration of equifinal combinations of outcomes (Fiss,
2011; Ragin, 2008). This analysis uses one outcome condition and six causal conditions.
The number of possible configurations is 26 (i.e. 64).
Consistency and Frequency Thresholds
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I determined that a theoretical configuration should have but one representative
case in order to qualify for further analysis. FsQCA mandates that at least 75% of cases
must be covered by the analysis. Choosing a higher coverage threshold did not allow this
minimum threshold to be met. Additionally, by setting the threshold to one, no data is
excluded meaning that any institutional configuration leading to high opportunity
entrepreneurship in the sample will be identified.
FsQCA utilizes a consistency score for measuring the extent to which
membership in a given configuration is indeed a subset of membership in the outcome in
order to make this decision. A coverage score is also used to describe the relevance of a
condition or a set of conditions to a particular outcome. Formulas for calculating fuzzy
consistency and coverage statistics of cause or causal combination, X, for the outcome,
Y, are as follows (Ragin, 2008: 134):
Consistency (Xi < Yi) = E[ min(Xi,Yi)]/ £(Xi)
Coverage (Xi < Yi) = E[ min(Xi,Yi)]/ I(Y i)
I use 0.80 as the consistency threshold consistent with prior literature (e.g., Crilly, 2011;
Bell et ah, 2013; Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown, 2014) and above the minimum
consistency threshold permissible as outlined in Ragin (2006).
Calibration
In order to perform fsQCA, all data must be calibrated to membership scores [0,
1], where a value of 0 indicates complete non-membership and a value of 1 indicates full
membership. Data can be calibrated in several ways. Many times, it is preferable to rely
completely on theory-driven calibration based on scholarly expertise; however, this is not
always possible. Other times, data must be calibrated based on the structure of the data.
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For continuous data that does not cluster, a continuous calibration technique is often
appropriate (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Since all causal conditions in my study
exhibited this structure, I used fsQCA’s calibration operation. To use this operation, it
was necessary to stipulate a full membership point (i.e. calibration = 1.00), a crossover
point, (i.e. calibration = 0.50) above which a condition is determined to be mostly a
member, and a complete non-membership point (i.e. calibration = 0.00). I used the same
techniques as Fiss (2011) to select these three points, which Ragin (2006) termed the
“direct” approach to calibration. Specifically, the 75th percentile for each variable was
designated as the full membership threshold, the mean was designated as the crossover
point, and the 25th percentile was designated as the full non-membership point.
For the outcome variable, the residual of opportunity entrepreneurship after GDP
per capita’s structural component lends itself well to a quartile split (i.e. codes of 0, 0.33,
0.66, and 1) is possible. Accordingly, I split the outcome variable and causal conditions
into quartiles. For a full list of the countries included in this study as well as their
membership score in the set opportunity entrepreneurship, refer back to Table 3.2.
3.5 RESULTS
Results for the fsQCA examination of sufficiency for high opportunity
entrepreneurship are presented in Table 3.3. Sufficiency means that each of these
configurations, when viewed holistically, should in most cases result in opportunity
entrepreneurship. The table displays the intermediate solution, which is more
appropriate, when a sample represents a significantly reduced subset of the overall
population and when counter factual s theoretical counterfactuals are introduced into the
model. In Table 3 .3 ,1 follow past research (e.g., Crilly, 2011; Judge et al., 2014), and
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indicate that the presence of a causal condition with a bolded circle (“• ”) and the absence
of a causal condition with a slashed circle (“0 ”). A blank space indicates that a condition
does not matter (i.e., can be absent or present) in that given configuration. Consistency
statistics, roughly analogous to the t-score for coefficients in OLS regression, describe the
extent to which nations that assemble these institutional profiles experience the outcome.
Coverage values, on the other hand, roughly analogous to r-squared, denote the empirical
relevance or importance of the solution (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
Configurations 1,2, 3 are almost always sufficient for high opportunity
entrepreneurship while configurations 4-6 are almost always sufficient for low
opportunity entrepreneurship. The three configurations sufficient for high opportunity
entrepreneurship demonstrated coverage of 0.47 and a consistency of 0.83. The overall
solution consistency of 0.83, for the three high configurations, means that the solution
would be expected to lead to opportunity entrepreneurship in roughly 83% of cases. The
consistency score of 0.47 indicates that the solution composes 47% of all higher than
expected opportunity entrepreneurship outcomes. These values reveal that these three
configurations are in fact Boolean subsets of the high performance set, and account for a
substantial percentage of the high opportunity entrepreneurship institutional profiles.
Raw coverage scores in the table show the portion of opportunity
entrepreneurship that is contained in the indicated configuration, and unique coverage
show the portion of opportunity entrepreneurship that is only covered by the indicated
configuration and no others. Coverage statistics here are consistent with and even exceed
several other studies (e.g., Crilly, 2010; Fiss, 2011; Garcia-Castro et ah, 2013). In sum,
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these results show that several discrete, discernible national institutional gestalts explain
differences in opportunity entrepreneurship across the sample.
Configuration 1 contained mainly developed countries: the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Finland, France, Norway, and Chile. In Configuration 1, regulatory ease,
capital availability for entrepreneurs, and control o f corruption combine to lead to high
levels of opportunity entrepreneurship. The other three components: the degree to which
the skill development system targets entrepreneurship, property rights protection, and
even an entrepreneurial culture are all superfluous.
The causal conditions leading to Configuration 2 are logically consistent with
those leading to Configuration 1, but the elements that matter are largely different. Only
regulatory ease unites the configurations in terms of present conditions. In addition to
regulatory ease, the skill development system’s emphasis on entrepreneurship and
property rights protection are also present. Interestingly, and in support of
Noorderhaven’s (1999) dissatisfaction hypothesis, a lack of entrepreneurial culture also
contributes to the outcome. Countries within Configuration 2 include Uruguay, Slovenia,
and Norway. Note that due to the logical consistency of the two configurations, Norway
appears in both Configurations 1 and 2.
Configuration 3 contains Mexico and Peru. In this configuration, in contrast to
Configuration 2, a strong entrepreneurial culture is a driving force. This configuration
relies on both the presence of capital availability, skill development system geared
towards entrepreneurship as well as control o f corruption. Surprisingly, the absence of
property rights was also consistent with high opportunity entrepreneurship in this
configuration. One explanation is that many of the opportunity entrepreneurs in this
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configuration could be attempting to operate in the informal or even renegade economy.
While much of the entrepreneurship in these countries is legitimate (Acs & Amoros,
2008), some clearly is not (Webb, Tihanyi, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). Another
explanation is that informal arrangements and social networks may substitute for more
formal property rights in these countries.
Configurations 4-6 are associated with low levels of opportunity
entrepreneurship. Overall, the presence of elements of the national business system as
well as entrepreneurial culture are less prominent for countries with low levels of
opportunity entrepreneurship. However, the fact that these configurations include the
presence of conditions that theoretically lead to entrepreneurship shows that even
countries with some of the right institutional elements in place can fall short of creating
the right recipe for opportunity entrepreneurship to flourish.
3.6 DISCUSSION
The aim of the analysis was to explore how different combinations of a diverse
array of institutional components combine in relation to opportunity entrepreneurship by
using fsQCA to analyze Whitley’s notion of national business systems (1999) along with
entrepreneurial culture across 45 countries. Overall, the analysis yields several key
results. First, there are multiple paths leading to high levels of opportunity
entrepreneurship. Second, none of the components of the national business system nor
entrepreneurial culture are sufficient by themselves to lead to the outcome. That is, the
effectiveness of a society’s institutions depends on how they configure with each other.
Third, the analysis identifies three institutional configurations that lead to relatively high
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opportunity entrepreneurship. One of these consisting of mostly developed countries,
while the other two contain developing countries.
This study further strengthens the established linkage between countries’
institutional components and entrepreneurship. The central finding that emerged is that
there are multiple and equifinal institutional combinations of causal conditions that are
associated with high levels of opportunity entrepreneurship at a macro-level. Moreover,
none of the institutional elements nor entrepreneurial culture were sufficient by
themselves to lead to opportunity entrepreneurship. This is consistent with the core
proposition.
Interestingly, no configuration contained the presence of all of the
entrepreneurship conducive conditions. Instead, some institutions seem to behave
synergistically; causal conditions may behave as functional complements or substitutes.
Notably, regulatory ease is an important causal condition in Configurations 1 and 2.
However, there it combines with capital availability and control o f corruption.
Conversely, in Configuration 2 it combines with property rights protections and the skill
development system. Thus the two configurations each suggest a pair of causal conditions
that substitute for one another. That is, results suggest that the presence of high levels of
opportunity entrepreneurship can be achieved without a full contingent of conducive
causal conditions but rather with complex, intricate, and , at times, non-intuitive gestalts
of them.
The equifinality principle is a central lesson here. Results suggest that rather than
one prescription, there are multiple paths for creating opportunity entrepreneurship.
Recent examinations (Stenholm, Acs, & Wuebker, 2013; Valdez & Richardson, 2013)
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use the usual “net-effects” paradigm, in which independent variables compete to explain
variance. Methods like OLS regression assume independence between causal factors and
an outcome that is a linear combination of these factors. In those paradigms, there is one
optimal solution. These results reveal that there are at least three bundles of institutions
that produce higher than expected numbers of entrepreneurs pursuing opportunities.
Support for the Core Proposition should alter the way that scholars theorize about
and analyze national institutions in relation to entrepreneurship. Findings indicate that
none of the institutional components alone is sufficient for opportunity entrepreneurship.
This study’s findings are in line with Hirsch (1997), who argued that institutional
components must function as a system. This systems thinking is in line with findings
here. Traditionally, scholars such as D ’Andrade (1984) have held that these systems are
actually over determined in that “social sanctions plus pressure for conformity, plus
intrinsic direct reward, plus values, are all likely to act together to give a particular
meaning system its directive force.” By operationalizing Whitley (1999) along with
entrepreneurial culture as components that can be integrated into configurations or
bundles of institutions, 1join recent studies analyzing societies as bundles of institutions
rather than, methodologically implied, independent institutional variables (Jackson &
Deeg, 2008; Pajunen, 2008; Vis, et al., 2013), uncovering the relationships between
institutional variables and a highly relevant outcome.
Additionally, two configurations (Configurations 1 and 2) associated with high
opportunity entrepreneurship were composed of primarily developed countries, while
Configuration 3 was not. This suggests that high levels of opportunity entrepreneurship
can be achieved at almost any level of economic development given the right institutions

I also corroborate recent work in development studies (i.e. Williamson, 2009),
indicating that scholars focusing on one aspect of institutions (e.g. the legal framework)
independent of the others may miss the big picture. Work on institutional stickiness
criticizes treatments of cultural-cognitive elements alone, because such work does not
incorporate the ways in which regulative elements shape culture (Boettke, Coyne &
Leeson 2008). Institutional stickiness is the notion conceptualizing the speed at which
institutional change can unfold in a society. This concept is particularly important for the
enactment of new regulative elements because they are relatively easy to alter, yet may
not receive broad public support or buy-in. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1998)
observed that common law, arising endogenously, was far more effective than legislated
civil law. Similarly, Scott (2007) and Ostrom (2000) both document how endogenously
emergent institutions avoid many undesirable consequences that plague top down
artificially imposed solutions. Despite the problems with isolating institutional elements
because they shape one another over time, past work on institutions and entrepreneurship
has taken exactly that approach. Hopefully, these findings encourage scholars to start
viewing institutions in bundles instead. Future research should focus on the
complementariness or substitutability of institutions.
Implications for Policymakers
Findings here present two major warnings to policymakers wishing to boost
entrepreneurial activity within societies. First, these findings should serve caution to
policymakers who only wish to target one element of the national business system. When
institutional components are not harmonious, public policy may be rendered ineffective.
For instance, simply reducing regulatory burdens when other elements of the national
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business system are absent, may not be sufficient to increase entrepreneurial outcomes.
My approach encourages policymakers to take a step back and recognize that the entirety
of the institutional bundle functions together rather than focusing on one institution or
type of institution. As scholars and policymakers view institutions as holistic bundles,
better and more targeted institutional prescriptions can emerge at the margins. This
approach allows policymakers to view existing institutional profiles as laboratories for
mixing ingredients together. These policymakers can view the successes of smaller
countries as valuable insights about institutional synergies that may work elsewhere.
On the other hand, for the past two and a half decades, the “Washington
Consensus” has driven many global economic reforms aiming to increase
entrepreneurship and other important macro-level variables. The “Washington
Consensus” worked under the assumption that the United States’ regulatory institutional
profile, robust enough to win the Cold War, could be transplanted almost anywhere
(Black, Kraakman, & Tarassova (2000) to build entrepreneurial economies (Schramm,
2004). Several scholars, however, have bemoaned that the behavior of economic agents is
a result of both amenable regulatory conditions and the historical events and social
contexts that have shaped them (e.g. Murrell, 1993). These scholars have argued that the
“Washington Consensus” may be very successful in some places but not others. For
instance, after the Cold War those formerly socialist countries whose cultural and
behavioral norms more closely mirror the United States’ have been more successful in
adopting American style institutions (Izyumov & Claxon, 2009). This analysis implies
equifinal paths in reaching high levels of opportunity entrepreneurship, such that
policymakers do not have to follow the Washington consensus but can instead, forge
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alternative paths. In the 21st century, where the transition of Africa and Latin America
will be of critical importance, it will be critical for policymakers to step back and view
each country’s entire institutional profile.
Limitations
This study does have a few limitations. First, in any kind of institutions-outcome
study, it is difficult to completely rule out endogeneity concerns. The theoretical
viewpoint of this paper is that institutions impact development via intermediate processes
such as entrepreneurship. However, it is difficult to dismiss the notion that there are
feedback loops between economic growth and development levels and opportunity
entrepreneurship. However, explicitly placing variables such as economic growth in the
model is no solution as they may veil the true impact of the institutions in terms of their
necessity and sufficiency for entrepreneurship. However, controlling for GDP per capita
in the outcome variable does relive many of these concerns.
A second limitation of cross-country institutional examinations is that it must be
assumed that institutions are homogeneous throughout a given society. Most archival
institutional data are provided at the national level. In small countries like Switzerland
and Israel, this is of little concern. However, in large countries with known regional
variation (e.g. China, Russia, and the United States) this may be problematic. The
richness of institutional varieties in these large countries are not captured even though
distinct “sub” institutions may apply to significantly more people than the society
spanning institutions in smaller countries. Conversely, perhaps some of the institutional
gestalts the analysis identified are artificially subdivided because they permeate and span
several countries, i.e. transnational institutions (Allen & Aldred, 2011).
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Finally, a third limitation in this study is that fsQCA does not offer insights into
longitudinal changes in the causal conditions or the outcome variable. I attempted to
control for this by selecting observations for the causal conditions that occurred either
before or concurrent with the outcome. However, when a true longitudinal analysis
cannot be conducted, it is impossible to conclusively state the direction of causality or
explore changes in the institutional components over time. While, institutions are by
nature stable, they do evolve and change over time (North, 1990) and may be partially
determined, in the long run by opportunity entrepreneurship.
Conclusion
Results support the literature (i.e. Boettke, Coyne, Leeson, & Sautet, 2005;
Holmes et al., 2013) suggesting that institutions are tightly linked. Employing fuzzy-set
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) allowed for the identification of institutional
and cultural bundles that form synergies enabling opportunity entrepreneurship. This
study contributes to a growing body of research that attempts to distinguish impactful
entrepreneurship from self-employment.
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3.8 TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 3.1: Construct Measurement and Data Sources
Capital
Availability

Average of 6 items
(country experts)

Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
National Expert Survey (2010)

Skill Development
System

Average of 6 items
(country experts)

Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
National Expert Survey (2010)

Regulatory Ease

Average of 7 items
(country experts)

Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
National Expert Survey (2010)

Property Rights

Average of 5 items
(country experts)

Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
National Expert Survey (2010)

Entrepreneurial
Culture
Control of
Corruption

Opportunity
Entrepreneurship

Average of 5 items
answered by country
experts.
Average of 13 corruption
indices gathered
worldwide.
Portion of Opportunity
Entrepreneurs above or
below structural
expectations based on GDP
per capita.

Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
National Expert Survey (2010)
Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index
(2010)
GEM Adult Population Survey
(2010)
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Table 3.2: Opportunity Entrepreneurship Calibration by Country (N=45)

AFRICA (7)

Calibration

EUROPE (17)

Calibration

AMERICAS (12)

Calibration

Angola

0.33

Croatia

0.00

Argentina

0.33

Egypt

0.00

Finland

0.67

Brazil

1.00

Ghana

0.33

France

0.67

Chile

1.00

South Africa

0.00

Germany

0.33

Colombia

0.00

Tunisia

0.67

Greece

0.67

Costa Rica

0.00

Uganda

0.00

Ireland

0.33

Guatemala

0.00

Zambia

1.00

Italy

0.67

Jamaica

0.00

Hungary

1.00

Mexico

1.00

ASIA (9)
China

0.00

Latvia

0.67

Peru

1.00

Iran

0.00

Norway

1.00

Trinidad & Tobago

1.00

Israel

0.33

Portugal

0.33

United States

0.33

Japan

0.00

Russia

0.00

Uruguay

1.00

Malaysia

1.00

Slovenia

0.67

Pakistan

0.00

Spain

0.33

Saudi Arabia

1.00

Sweden

1.00

South Korea

0.00

Switzerland

1.00

Turkey

0.00

United Kingdom

1.00
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Table 3.3: Sufficiency Table for Opportunity Entrepreneurship
Hig;h Opportunity
En trepreneurship
C2
Cl
C3

Low Opportunity
Entrepreneurship
C4
C5
C6

Regulatory Ease

•

•

Capital Availability

•

Causal Condition

•
•

Skill Development

•

•

0

Property Rights

•

0

•

•

0

Control o f Corruption

•

Entrepreneurial

0

0
0

0

•

•
0

•

0

•
China

Ireland

0.12

0.10

0.07

0
Costa
Tfc!
0.16

0.06

0.07

0.09

0.05

0.13

0.87

0.82

0.93

0.83

0.83

Exemplar

UK

Uruguay

Raw Coverage

0.33

0.18

Unique Coverage

0.18

Consistency

0.83

•
Mexico

_ _

Solution Coverage

0.47

0.30

Solution Consistency

0.83

0.88
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CHAPTER 4
ESSAY III: A CROSS-LEVEL EXAMINATION OF INSTITUTIONS, INCOME,
AND ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENTIONS
4.1 ABSTRACT
This essay advances scholarship on the institutions-entrepreneurship relationship. I
propose that the dimensions of a country’s national business system directly impact
individual entrepreneurial intentions and that individual income serves as a contingency
factor in this relationship. That is, individuals with higher incomes are better able to
deviate from dominant institutional logics. My cross-level analyses of 49,013 individuals
from 48 diverse countries supports the notion that institutions have a greater impact on
low-income individuals with respect to entrepreneurial outcomes. The study contributes
to a more nuanced understanding of embedded agency within the institutional logics
perspective. It bridges the literatures on individual entrepreneurship and the institutional
logics perspective. Furthermore, the study provides context and evidence on the impact of
income on choice and economic well-being.
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4.2 INTRODCTION
Do institutions impact everyone equally? Under what situations will individuals
and organizations deviate from dominant institutions? And which individuals are more
likely to depart from dominant and institutionalized rules of the game? These are key
issues in examining how social, economic, cultural, and technological change occur; yet,
the literature is yet to fully address them. Though some scholars have examined which
organizations are most likely to deviate from industry norms (e.g. Greenwood &
Suddaby, 2006) and a few have investigated which actors will deviate from institutional
norms within organizations (e.g. Battilana, 2006) no one has explored which individuals
are more likely to deviate from institutional expectations at a societal level. Under the
institutional logics perspective, such questions can begin to be answered.
The institutional logics perspective (e.g. Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton,
2002; Seo & Creed, 2002; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsberry, 2012; Pache & Santos, 2012;
Friedland, 2013) focuses on how broader belief systems shape the cognition, behavior,
identity, and goals of economic actors. Under this view, entrepreneurs demonstrate
individual agency subject to complex systems of institutional forces. In most situations,
individuals comply and agree with dominant institutional forces which shape their
willingness and ability to act; however, in certain situations and contexts, some
individuals deviate from established rules, norms, and cognitions and engage in activities
that would not be expected under dominant institutional logics conditions (Battilana &
D ’Aunno, 2009; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009). This notion of real yet limited
individual freedom with respect to institutions is known as embedded agency
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(Granovetter, 1985; Seo & Creed, 2002; Garad & Kamoe, 2003; Greenwood & Suddaby,
2006; Green, Li, & Nohria, 2009).
To help address issues relating to embedded agency under the growing
institutional logics perspective literature’s view of individuals’ future goals, I examine
individuals’ intentions to engage in new venture activity. Under many systems of
institutional logics, particularly in societies where market logics are dominant, engaging
in new venture activity is perceived as a completely normal and, indeed, laudable, pursuit
(Greenman, 2013; Watson, 2013). However, in other societies new venture activity runs
counter to dominant institutional ideologies and engaging may proves very difficult, if
even considered at all (Mair & Marti, 2009).
In this study, I address the role that individual characteristics and resources play
in allowing actors to break away from dominant institutional norms and engage in
entrepreneurship. I do so by examining whether income level moderates the relationship
between dominant institutional logics and entrepreneurial intentions. Entrepreneurial
intentions was selected as the appropriate outcome variable because choosing a
dependent variable that occurred contemporaneously to the exploitation stage would
conflate the relationship between and the decision to start a new venture and individual
income. Results indicate that income level weakens the relationship between dominant
market institutions, the national business system (Whitley, 1999) and entrepreneurial
intentions.
My study has several implications for the understanding of institutions,
entrepreneurship, and poverty. First, it further demonstrates the value of the institutional
logics perspective in explaining the nature of how institutions impact individuals. By
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highlighting a situation in which agents differ in their responses to institutional forces, the
importance of one of the institutional logics perspective’s defining features, embedded
agency, is further validated. Second, this study advances understanding about the
entrepreneurship-opportunity nexus (Shane, 2000). Entrepreneurship scholars have
increasingly grappled with whether personal or contextual characteristics matter most for
successful entrepreneurship. This study argues for a balanced view of supply and demand
side variables that influence entrepreneurial outcomes (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003). Third,
this study has important implications for the study of global poverty. It does so by
highlighting a situation in which dominant institutional logics seem to have a stronger
impact on the global poor than those with higher income. Specifically, lower income
individuals are more impacted and constrained by dominant institutional forces than
higher income individuals. In the future, policymakers and academics that examine the
net effects of institutions on country-level outcomes would do well to explore whether
the poor are disproportionately influenced within each country.
4.3

THEORY DEVELOPMENT

Institutional Logics, Embedded Agency, and Entrepreneurship
The institutional logics perspective views institutions as the results of systems of
inter-connected and logically cohesive ideologies that have taken root within societies
over long periods of time. These systems of institutional logics are “socially constructed,
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space,
and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). In sum,
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institutional logics are the underlying thought patterns and worldviews that support and
shape human behavior.
Any given institutional logic is composed o f multiple practices, beliefs, values,
and rules. By participating with these institutions, agents gain identity, legitimacy, a basis
of attention, a basis for strategy, and goals for the future (Ocasio, 1997). These goals may
be supported by some institutional logics and contradicted by others. In many cases,
institutional logics are at odds with one another. Thus, the central thesis of the
institutional logics perspective is that rationality and values vary according to
institutional order (Friedland, 2013).
Relatedly, the institutional logics perspective supports the notion that individuals
(Thornton et al., 2012) are embedded agents using individual discretion within a complex
institutional milieu. That is, individuals are neither under- nor over- socialized
(Granovetter, 1985; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990; Garud & Kamoe, 2003). People have
freedom but in a very constrained manner. At any one time, individuals’ behavior is
shaped by multiple pressures according to the different logics in which they are
embedded. Individuals end up choosing which goals to pursue based on the institutional
logic that shapes their focus of attention (Thornton et al., 2012). Individuals’ focus of
attention is shaped by: (a) the degree to which a particular institutional logic has been
historically institutionalized within a given society (b) the degree to which agents are
embedded in fields consisting of conflicting logics and (c) the situational context(s) (i.e.
the immediate time and place) in which individuals find themselves (Thornton, et al.,
2012 ).

Market Logics and Entrepreneurship

The institutional logics’ perspective reasons that individuals’ cognitions and
behaviors are culturally embedded within multiple competing institutional logics.
Thornton (2004) identified at least seven types of institutional logics undergirding
individuals’ intentions: family, religion, the state, community, profession, corporation,
and market. Under market logics, embedded agents are more likely to act
entrepreneurially and engage in growth oriented entrepreneurship (Miller, Breton-Miller,
& Lester, 2011; Thornton et al., 2012). This is because under market logics the goal of
the individual is to pursue self-interest by seeking status in the market through
competition. Market logics hold that individuals ought to be motivated to pursue
perceived profit opportunities in pursuit of personal gain via transactions, innovation,
venturing, and risk-taking (Thornton et al., 2005). For instance, Cho and Hambrick
(2006) found that as the airline industry activated market logics following deregulation, it
began acting more entrepreneurially. Similarly, a shift from a professional to market
logics in the publishing industry in the mid-20th century shifted goals from prestige and
recognition to profits (Thornton, 2002).
At a societal level, strong market logics increase entrepreneurship. Societies with
strong market logics are characterized by compelling market incentives, strong property
rights, and widely available capital (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2010). Consequently, they
increase real entrepreneurial opportunities since they support ventures that would not
otherwise be economically viable (i.e. real opportunities). Societies with inadequate
market logics based institutions restrict and complicate the exploitation of new ventures
(Baumol, Schilling, & Wolff, 2009). “The level of entrepreneurship that develops in a

121
society is directly related to the society’s regulations and policies governing the
allocation of rewards” (Bruton et al., 2010: 425).
Market Logics, the National Business System, and Entrepreneurial Intentions
Dominant market logics are reflected in Whitley’s notion of varying national
business systems. As illustrated in Bowen and De Clercq (2007) the national business
system approach advanced by Whitley (1991, 1994, 1999), provides a theoretical
framework that allows scholars to identify the distinctive aspects of a nation's
institutional environment that explains differences in entrepreneurial outcomes.
According to Whitley (1999) these systems function in a cohesive, logically consistent
manner with the different dimensions reinforcing one another. Thus, it follows that at the
root of an entrepreneurship-conducive national business system are strong market logics.
According to Whitley (1999), national business systems are “distinctive
configurations of hierarchy-market relations which become institutionalized as relatively
successful ways of the organizing economic activities in different institutional
environments.” Effectively, Whitley argues that the way a country's economic activities
are organized and undertaken reflect the strength and substance of its’ institutionalized
market logics. Thus, I take as given that a society with strong and pervasive market logics
will express those logics via a strong national business system. This expression will shape
actors’ behaviors, perspective, and intentions with respect to entrepreneurship. Thus, the
stronger the national business system, the greater the degree that future entrepreneurial
intentions will be pervasive within a society.
Whitley (1999: 47) went on to identify four constellations of national institutional
elements that influence individual’s economic activities within societies: These elements
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are (1) the financial system, (2) the skill development system, (3) the state, and (4)
trust/authority relations. I follow Bowen & De Clercq (2007) and use Whitley's four
categories to identify important aspects of a society's institutional context explaining why
countries differ with respect to their population’s intentions to create new venture. I argue
that the expression of another important entrepreneurship measure, individuals’
entrepreneurial intentions, is probably shaped by:
1.

the accessibility of financial capital for new ventures;

2.

the degree to which its skill development system focuses on

entrepreneurship;
3.

the degree to which the state’s legal framework supports entrepreneurship
as evidenced by,
a) its regulatory burden for launching new ventures,
b) property rights protection for both physical and intellectual
property;

4.

the level of corruption displayed in the interaction of different economic
actors (Bowen & De Clercq, 2007).

Below I develop hypotheses regarding each of these dimensions of the national business
system by arguing for their significance in shaping individuals’ entrepreneurial
intentions.
The Availability o f Financial Capital fo r New Ventures
The degree to which financial capital is available for new ventures through debt,
equity, government subsidies, and venture capitalists for starting new ventures is the first
element of the national business system. The availability of funding that a society’s
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financial system provides significantly determines the rate of new venture activity (Levie
& Autio, 2008). This is because young businesses frequently necessitate a considerable
level of external funding for startup capital (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). This startup
capital may be comprised of funds obtained from informal investors (Szerb, Rappai,
Makra, & Terjesen, 2007), formal venture capital firms (Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen,
2004), or banks (Cetorelli & Strahan, 2006). Thus, in general, entrepreneurs rely on a
society having a financial system that considers the detailed requirements of new
ventures (De Clercq, Lim, & Oh, 2013).
The degree to which entrepreneurs are able to access capital in order to launch
and grow new ventures varies a great deal between countries (Bygrave, Hay, Ng, &
Reynolds, 2003; Lim, Morse, Mitchell, & Seawright, 2011). The extent to which the
financial capital availability affects entrepreneurial thinking and intentions depends, for
one, on the liquidity o f capital. In general, equity-based systems tend to be far more
liquid than baking systems. That is, capital in societies in which a banking system is
dominant tend to provide financial capital to entrepreneurs at higher interest rates
(Whitley, 1999). Thus, it seems likely that in societies in which the national business
system makes financial capital systematically available to new ventures, entrepreneurial
aspirations will increase because individuals know that the resources necessary to launch
a new venture are readily obtainable. This leads to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis la : The availability of financial capital available for new ventures will be
positively associated with individuals’ intentions to start a new business.
The Skill Development System’s Focus on Entrepreneurship
According to Whitley (1999) another important feature of the national business
system affecting entrepreneurs are the institutions responsible for the development of
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human capital (i.e. the skill development system). Whitley, emphasizes that the degree to
which practical pedagogy occurs via the cooperation of businesses and post-secondary
educational institutions can have a strong influence on individuals’ career and vocational
choices. I define the quality of the skill development system aimed at new ventures as the
degree to which post-secondary and adult education provide good preparation for starting
up and growing new ventures.
Education in general encourages and improves entrepreneurship because it
provides individuals with autonomy and self-efficacy, informs them of career choices,
and gives them an understanding of the objective social fabric whereby they can
recognize market opportunities (Reynolds, Hay, & Camp, 1999). According to Verheul,
Wennekers, Audretsch, and Thurik, (2002), it is possible to distinguish between “general
education and more specific education focusing on the promotion of entrepreneurship and
stimulating entrepreneurial skills and knowledge” (50). The skill development system can
target entrepreneurship by encouraging market cognizance, improving the perceived
social standing enjoyed by entrepreneurs, and, most importantly, developing crucial
entrepreneurial skills (Gavron, Cowling, Holtham, & Westall, 1998). Entrepreneurial
characteristics such as innovativeness and risk taking can be developed via projects and
assignments throughout the educational process (Van der Kuip, 1998). Furthermore, past
studies indicate that tertiary institutions that offer entrepreneurship courses, build
students’ business acumen (OECD, 1998).
In these ways, a skill development system geared towards introducing students to
new venture formation and enhancing entrepreneurship-related skills increases the degree
to which individuals aspire to entrepreneurship. Accordingly, I reason, similarly to
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Bowen and De Clercq (2007) that the degree to which a country's skill development
system addresses and teaches entrepreneurship-related themes, issues, and best practices
will influence individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions. Thus, I propose:
Hypothesis lb: The degree to which the skill development system is aimed at
entrepreneurship will be positively associated with individuals’
intentions to start a new business.
The Regulatory Ease o f Launching New Ventures
To create a legitimate business, several legal requirements and hurdles must be
navigated (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). I define the
regulatory burden that faces entrepreneurs as the costs imposed through government
regulations on individuals wishing to launch a new venture. The degree and extent of
these costs and demands varies from country to country (Klapper, Laevan, & Raj an,
2006) and consist of the time, money, and effort required to meet these regulations
(Verheul et al., 2002). Such barriers discourage risk-taking and entrepreneurship as a
career (OECD, 1998).
Over regulation, for instance dampens the entrepreneurial spirit (Baumol, 1990).
It also serves as a significant entry barrier to small business. While larger businesses can
afford compliance offices specifically aimed at tackling regulations and dealing with the
government in general, small and young ventures struggle to deal with these
administrative costs. This distracts them from core exploitation activities. Regulatory
complexity also hampers firm growth (Nijsen, 2000). For instance, entrepreneurs may
decide not to expand their company and bring on new employees because of the number
of procedures and paperwork involved (Niehof, 1999). High transaction costs also
accumulate in situations where legislation is unclear (Verheul et al., 2002). Various
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government agencies and levels use differing terminology to discuss similar concepts.
This obfuscates government regulations and the availability of potential assistance. For
instance, national tax systems “often involve written rules, frequent changes, expiration
clauses and different layers of taxation (regional and national). Moreover, the ’language
of tax’ is usually difficult to comprehend” (Verheul et al., 2002: 32).
Djankov et al. (2001), discovered that people in Mozambique are required to
accomplish 19 different procedures, taking 149 business days at minimum to create a new
business. In comparison, a Canadian can create a new business in two days using just two
procedures. Overall, because regulatory burdens reduces the likelihood that individuals
will start a new business (Grilo & Thurik, 2005), a complex regulatory environment
reflects weak market logics that are unconducive to entrepreneurial aspirations to launch
new ventures. Individuals will be far less likely to aspire to engage in entrepreneurship
where market logics are thwarted by such burdens. Thus,
Hypothesis lc: The regulatory ease of creating new ventures will be positively
associated with individuals’ intentions to start a new business.
Property Rights Protection
Perhaps the best documented dimension from Whitley’s (1999) frameworks is the
notion that property rights are of substantial importance for incentivizing
entrepreneurship (e.g. North, 1986; 1990, La Porta et al., 1997). As it relates to
entrepreneurship, property rights refer to the degree to which individuals’ proprietary
assets are protected by society so that individuals can capitalize on them. A key
institutional aspect governing efficient business transactions is a country's “rule of law”
(La Porta et al., 1997; North, 1986; Whitley, 1999). A lucid and impartial justice system
that preserves and protects private property along with a general acceptance and
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understanding of transactions that encourage market participation serve to reduce
transaction costs such that entrepreneurial activity can thrive (Johnson MacMillan, &
Woodruff, 2002). Intellectual property rights are especially important for important for
entrepreneurs as the creation and exploitation of intellectual property is the fundamental
motive for innovativeness and, consequently, entrepreneurial action (Schumpeter, 1934).
Indeed, U.S. evidence indicates that innovative and talented individuals are more likely to
exploit their talents or inventions in the market under conditions of secure intellectual
property rights (Sobel, 2008).
Without secure property rights any opportunity that entrepreneurs perceive may
be illusory as there are no safeguards that it will not be stolen or duplicated during the
exploitation stage. Entrepreneurs in countries with poor property rights protection are
often unwilling to reinvest their earnings into productive processes or capital (physical or
human) formation activities (Johnson et al., 2002). Baumol (1990) explained centuries of
low levels of entrepreneurship in countries such as China by describing how the legal
system could not and did not enforce contracts. McMullen, Bagby, & Palich (2006)
validated this argument in contemporary times with data from 36 countries. I argue that
in addition to prior findings, a country’s property rights protections impact individuals’
ability and willingness to launch new ventures because they believe that the rule of law
will safeguard their efforts and creative actions. Thus, strong property rights protection
reflect market logics supportive of entrepreneurs’ intentions to engage in
entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis Id: Property rights protections for new ventures will be positively associated
with individuals’ intentions to start a new business.
Trust Relations and the Control o f Corruption
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Corruption describes the degree to which opportunism occurs in business
transactions. Whitley (1994) describes how entrepreneurial behavior is strongly linked to
the reliability or trustworthiness of its citizens and organizations. Corruption may include
bribing public officials (Choi & Thum, 2005), breaking a contract, or privately
appropriating gains that belong to someone else or the business. “When corruption is
present, the entrepreneur faces greatly increased risk that those involved in her value
chain will be opportunistic and appropriate the profits or rents to which the entrepreneur
believes she is entitled” (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). Corruption occurs, in part, due to
information asymmetry that is characteristic of complex and information rich
transactions. Past work confirms this, showing that the absence of corruption (presence of
trust) positively impacts complex activities such as innovation (Dakhli & De Clercq,
2004).
Pervasive corruption makes investment in resource accumulation and
recombination unfeasible (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). Repeated negative encounters with
other actors weakens beliefs about their reliability. Thus, trust is eroded where corruption
is prevalent. Repeated transaction patterns and experiences throughout society determine
whether trust or corruption becomes institutionalized at a national level (Anokhin &
Schulze, 2009). Thus, national business systems vary to the degree in which corruption is
manifested.
I add to prior literature on corruption by arguing and examining the notion that a
country’s level of corruption not only harms the entrepreneurship process but actually
limits the degree to which entrepreneurs are willing to launch new ventures. In activities
where payment is difficult to monitor due to uncertainty geographic, or temporal
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distance, corruption destroys the ability of entrepreneurs to act confidently. Thus,
corruption erodes entrepreneurs’ valuations of potential opportunities. Thus, where
transaction risks are high due to corruption, uncertain payoffs reduce the number of both
perceived and real opportunities. On the other hand, when market opportunities can be
evaluated objectively without a high risk of corruption, such costs become negligible,
opportunities become observable and real, and entrepreneurs can act. Thus, I argue that in
addition to prior findings concerning corruption’s corrosive effects on the
entrepreneurship process, a country’s corruption levels actually decreases entrepreneurs’
willingness to launch new ventures because it reduces the number of true, exploitable
opportunities that individuals observe.
Hypothesis le: The degree to which the societal corruption level is controlled will be
positively associated with individuals’ intentions to start a new business.
Weak Market Logics, Low Income, and Entrepreneurial Intentions
I argue here, that while weak market logics adversely impact all individuals via
the national business system, they have a far stronger adverse impact on lower income
individuals than higher income individuals. That is, in institutional environments with
weak market logics, wealthier individuals are in better position to deviate from dominant
institutional practices, behaviors and thought patterns and begin creating identities and
goals consistent with entrepreneurship. Therefore, I hypothesize that the societal level
institutional environment will interact with individual income level such that the effects
of institutions on intentions to launch a new venture will be far stronger for low income
individuals than for high income individuals. That is income levels moderate the
institutions to entrepreneurial intentions relationship in such a way that the wealthy are
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better able to practice agency in the face of inclement institutions. This effect occurs for
three major reasons:
1. Market logics are unequally distributed within a society. The powerful may have
them but do not grant them to the poor. Thus, capabilities associated with market
logics are unobtainable for the poor.
2. The cognitive accessibility of market logics is lower where other institutional
logics (family, religion) dominate. Any market logics cognitions the poor may have
are crowded out by cultural embeddedness or are not accessed due to day to day
social situations in which the poor normally participate.
3. The costs of engaging in entrepreneurship are higher in societies without strong
market logics due to lack of available capital and resource scarcity. This
disproportionately effects the poor because they simply cannot afford to act
entrepreneurially due to poverty and the consequences of failure.
There are several reasons underlying the above assertions. With regards to the
first assertion, in many situations the powerful set up the rules of the game such that the
poor do not have access to market logics. Unfortunately, dominant institutional
ideologies are accompanied by a set of templates, rules and practices that are not
universally applied (Battilana, 2006). Differences in socioeconomic status often leads to
different levels of access to and power over both important resources and decision
making processes within society. As North (1993, p. 3) observed, “[Institutions are not
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they, or at least the
formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to
create new rules.” In societies with weak market logics, individuals with power and
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wealth may purposefully block, crowd out, and deny startup resources to lower income
individuals. These individuals impose more hierarchal institutional structures, which are
designed to maintain power.
Moreover, wealthier individuals have more experience with market capabilities
and knowledge, which gives them greater freedom to use market logics and ignore other
dominant institutional logics. The poor, on the other hand, may be deprived of education
and consequently not be exposed to ideas associated with business and entrepreneurship
in contexts where market logics are less prevalent. Thus, capabilities associated with
market behaviors are unobtainable to them. A shortage of quality skill development
institutions greatly limits the poor's knowledge in how to form and exploit new ventures
(Acs & Virgill, 2009). For instance, Elkan (1988) found that African entrepreneurs were
more likely to engage in the market if they were more educated and more likely to launch
their own venture if they had prior experience with large expatriate organizations.
With respect to the second assertion, even low income individuals who could be
strongly influenced by market logics may not utilize them due to cultural embedded and
common situational contexts, which determine the accessibility of possessed knowledge
associated with a given logic. “People who are deeply embedded in a particular
institutional logic through identification and socialization are more likely to invoke
knowledge that is part of the institutional logic” (Thornton et al., 2012: 84). If the poor
are deeply embedded in family, cultural, and cognitive institutions that ignore or reject
market logics, they will be less likely to embrace market logics even when such logics are
available. Urban settings, which are associated with higher incomes, decrease family and
cultural embeddedness.
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Besides cultural embeddedness, proximal situational contexts also affect the
temporary accessibility of market logics-related cognitions “by cueing associations
between the situation and available knowledge structures (Thornton et al., 2012: 84).”
Poor individuals will be less likely to encounter situations in which market logics are
expressed. Wealthier individuals on the other hand are more likely to be exposed to
market logics on a daily basis due to more interaction with media, internet sources, or
other individuals engaging with the market.
Regarding the third assertion, when institutions are unconducive in general to the
actions required to start a new venture, the poor are further disadvantaged. This is
because the costs of engaging in entrepreneurship are higher in societies without strong
market oriented institutions (North, 1990). Bounded rationality and opportunism prevail
in such societies. In such situations, entrepreneurial actions become far more costly as
individuals have no institutional guarantees that their efforts, even if economically sound
and wise, will be rewarded (North, 1990; 1993). This happens for a variety of reasons.
First, in societies with weak institutions there is a lack of information concerning what
goods or services to produce. Where there are high opportunity search and recognition
costs, agents may not attempt to be innovative or transformative. They may stick with
economic activities they are familiar with and avoid seeking new production possibilities
and market niches. (Mambula, 2002). For the very poor, this effect is amplified (Acs &
Virgill, 2009). Often, low income individuals simply cannot afford to abandon
subsistence activities to pursue new ventures. Thus, a combination of low income and a
poorly developed institutional framework have a profound negative impact amongst
embedded agents’ willingness and ability to launch new ventures. This is indeed an
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unfortunate poverty trap unfortunate because weak institutions and extremely low
incomes tend to be highly correlated.
In sum the notions of embedded agency coupled with the heterogeneous impacts
of institutions on individuals in the same society imply that the decision to engage in
entrepreneurship will be a function of institutions that are then moderated by individuals’
socio-economic status. That is, ceteris paribus, weaker institutions increase agents’
intentions to launch new ventures. However, the impact of weak institutions have a far
stronger impact on lower income individuals’ intentions to start a new business than
higher income individuals.
Financial Capital Availability and Low Income
I hypothesized above that the availability of financial capital for entrepreneurship
is linked to entrepreneurial intentions. I add to this argument by hypothesizing that this
relationship is moderated by income level. That is, in institutional environments marked
by a financial system that does not target new venture activity, wealthier individuals are
in better position to deviate from institutional norms and pursue entrepreneurship.
The individual income level of people can signal credibility and preparedness to
providers of external finance (Stuart, Hoang, & Hubels, 1999; Arthurs, Busenitz,
Hoskisson, & Johnson, 2009). Individuals who have only been exposed to subsistence
economic activities may lack skills needed to successfully present a compelling business
model to more skeptical capital even if their idea and opportunity are legitimately
profitable. Similarly, in societies with more expensive and less available financial capital
aimed at entrepreneurship, lenders and investors may discriminate against low income
individuals. Finally, in contexts with weaker market logics, if the poor are deeply
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embedded in family, cultural, and cognitive institutions that run counter to the notion of
obtaining financial capital from lenders and investors the poor will be less likely to access
financial capital. This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: The availability of financial capital for new ventures will be more
strongly positively associated with lower income individuals’ intentions to start a
new business than higher income individuals.
The Skill Development System and Low Income
Above, I hypothesized that the degree to which the skill development system is
geared towards entrepreneurship leads to entrepreneurial intentions. Here, I argue that
this relationship is moderated by income level. That is, for the poor, it is more important
to be embedded in a society dominated by strong market logics in which the skill
development system supports entrepreneurship. Conversely, in institutional environments
in which the skill development system is not geared towards entrepreneurship, wealthier
individuals are in better position to deviate from institutional regularities and engage the
entrepreneurship process. The arguments here, echo the above arguments regarding the
financial system.
First, in societies in which entrepreneurial education is weak, understanding of
entrepreneurial skills and processes are heterogeneous because only those individuals
with direct experience and exposure to other entrepreneurs and new venture activity gain
exposure to these skills. The wealthy are more likely to be engaged with the market and
acquire these skills because wealth determines the degree to which one buys goods and
services. Thus, because of poverty, the poor will be less likely to engage with
entrepreneurs and become familiar with entrepreneurial processes.
The poor are more likely to be deeply embedded in local and family logics
(Ansari, Munir, & Gregg, 2012). If the skill development system does not focus on

135
entrepreneurship, low income individuals will be less able to ignore dominant local logics
and pursue entrepreneurship. Additionally, the opportunity cost of acquiring information
about entrepreneurial skills may be prohibitive in societies where such skills are not
offered and promoted by the skill development system. Low income individuals may be
unable or unwilling to invest in education because they must work hard each day to
provide food and basic necessities to their families. Particularly, in rural situations where
geographic proximity to advanced education is great, low income individuals may be
unable to afford to leave home. Extremely low income individuals simply face an
existential threat when they forsake subsistence activities. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2b: The degree to which the skill development system is aimed at
entrepreneurship will be more strongly positively associated with lower income
individuals’ intentions to start a new business than higher income individuals.
Regulatory Ease and Low Income
Under Hypothesis 1 ,1 argued that clear and easy to navigate government
regulations towards entrepreneurship increase individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions. I
now extend this argument by proposing that this relationship is moderated by income
level. In institutional environments marked by complex regulations, wealthier individuals
are in better position to deviate from institutional logics that stifle new venture activity
and make entrepreneurship a goal. The poor on the other hand will be far less likely to
deviate from dominant institutional logics.
Regulatory burdens inordinately effects the poor for several reasons. First, the
poor are more likely to have less experience with more sophisticated economic
regulations and transactions and less likely to know others who understand them. Thus,
they may lack the capabilities and understanding necessary for compliance. Second, and
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perhaps most importantly, complex regulatory environments impose significant costs.
These are costs that the poor are unable to afford because it may include time, resources,
and attention necessary for subsistence activities. The time, number of tasks, and costs of
compliance may be prohibitive for the poor. This leads to Hypothesis 2c:
Hypothesis 2c: The regulatory ease of creating new ventures will be more strongly
positively associated with lower income individuals’ intentions to start a
new business than higher income individuals.
Property Rights Protection and Low Income
Above, I hypothesized that secure property rights promote individuals’
entrepreneurial intentions. Here, I argue that the relationship between property rights and
individuals intentions regarding new venture activity is moderated by income level. Weak
property rights will have a far greater impact on lower versus higher income individuals.
Wealthier individuals are in better position to deviate from institutional pressures because
they have the resources to protect their intellectual and physical property.
The poor are ill-equipped to deviate from societal norms and become
entrepreneurs for several reasons. First, property right protections may be unequally
distributed throughout a society such that only the physical and intellectual property of
the wealthy are protected. Second, the poor are more likely to be embedded in ideologies,
whether they be political, familial, communal, religious, or otherwise that run contrary to
ideas that support individual property rights. The notion of developing and exploiting a
profit-opportunity for individual gain may be anathema to logics that promote shared
property and activities. Third, the costs associated with lost property cannot be easily
shouldered by the poor. Leaving subsistence activities only to have the property at the
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core of their business model stolen is ruinous for the poor. For these three reasons, I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2d: Property rights protections for new ventures will be more strongly
positively associated with lower income individuals’ intentions to start a new
business than higher income individuals.
Control o f Corruption and Low Income
Finally, I argued in Hypothesis le. that societal corruption decreases
entrepreneurial intentions, ceteris paribus. I again, extend this argument here, by
proposing that corruption’s dampening impact on entrepreneurial intentions is
particularly toxic to the poor. That is, in environments in which corruption eats away at
market logics, wealthier individuals are better able to diverge from institutional norms
and pursue entrepreneurship than the poor.
The poor are disadvantaged for a handful of reasons related to the nature of
corruption within a society. First, of all weak members of society are more likely to be
the victims of corruption. The poor are far more likely to fall prey to opportunism due to
inexperience and ignorance with market activities. Corrupt individuals in power can take
advantage o f their naivete with regards to complex and difficult to monitor transactions.
Secondly, wealthier individuals can take steps to avoid corruption utilizing financial
resources. They can afford security. They can afford to better monitor transactions. And
they have the resources to obtain information and connections regarding the
trustworthiness of other actors. For these reasons, personal financial resources enable
individuals to overcome dominant institutional forces and become entrepreneurs. Thus, I
hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 2e: The degree to which the societal corruption level is controlled will be
more strongly positively associated with lower income individuals’
intentions to start a new business than higher income individuals.
Figure 1 displays the relationships subsumed by Hypotheses 1 and 2. In the
model, there is a direct relationship between market logics as manifested by the national
business system. This relationship is positively moderated by low income. That is, the
relationship between institutions and entrepreneurial intentions is stronger for low income
individuals.
[INSERT FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
4.4 METHODOLOGY
Data for this study were taken from several sources. Data for entrepreneurial
intentions (dependent variable) were taken from the 2010 Global Entrepreneurship Model
(GEM) Adult Population Survey. The GEM includes standardized measures for various
aspects of each surveyed country's entrepreneurial activities. In 2010 the GEM
interviewed almost 180,000 people from 59 geographically and economically dispersed
economies. O f these observations, much was not useable for this study. Observations
with missing data were removed. Additionally, countries in which income data were not
provided was also removed. I also removed countries for which there was incomplete
institutions’ data. Finally, due to the nature of the income variable, the income group in
each country containing the cutoff income level ($12, 500) were excluded (see footnote
on income level below). I was able to retain 49,013 observations from 48 different
economies. Individual level from the GEM’s 2010 Adult Population Survey, were
combined with data from archival sources the GEM’s 2010 National Expert Survey, data
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on corruption from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey, and
macroeconomic level from the World Bank.
Dependent Variable: Entrepreneurial Intentions
The GEM Adult Population Survey contains data on individuals’ entrepreneurial
intentions. The survey asks the question “Are you, alone or with others, expecting to start
a new business, including any type of self-employment, within the next three years?”
Answers take a binary form: yes or no. Prior literature has validated this measure as a
means of capturing entrepreneurial intentions (e.g. Klyver & Thornton, 2010;
Vinogradov & Gabelko, 2010; Klyver & Schott, 2011; Ashourizadeh, Chavoushi, &
Schott, 2014). Using entrepreneurial intentions rather than a more active (present-tense)
form of entrepreneurial activity as the dependent variable was important because o f the
nature of the key variable of interest: the level of income. By utilizing the future
entrepreneurial intentions o f individuals regarding entrepreneurship rather than current
participation, income data are not contaminated by the entrepreneurship decision of
interest.
Individual Level Independent Variables
Individual level independent and control variables are also taken from the GEM
Adult Population Survey. The primary individual-level variable of interest is income. I
created the income variable using the CIA World Factbook’s estimate for global mean
income of $12,500 dollars. Since I am primarily interested in how institutions affect the
poor, a value of greater than $12,500 was coded as 0 and a value less than $12,500 was
coded as l.4

4 In many countries the income variable is divided into thirds: high, medium and, low income groups. In
other countries it is divided at the median, into high and low income groups. These data were compared to
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Additional data were taken from the Adult Population Survey as controls. Age in
years, a binary variable for sex (female=l), a binary variable for whether the individual is
employed (employed=l), and binary indicators for the highest level of education {high
school, college and graduate degrees), and, finally, household size (number of family
members in the household) (e.g. Verheul & Van Mil, 2011; Ashourizadeh et al., 2014;
Jensen, Rezaei, & Wherry, 2014).
Country Level Independent Variables
GEM has also developed country-level entrepreneurship variables through its
National Expert Survey. That survey has developed standardized measures of business
and government experts’ perceptions of several key indicators of the country’s
entrepreneurial framework. The expert questionnaire assesses the institutional
environment, including elements of the national business system, specifically as it relates
to entrepreneurship. Several of the survey’s constructs contain multiple items. These
constructs have been demonstrated to be valid and reliable (Bowen & Clercq, 2007).
Here, I follow Bowen & De Clercq (2007) and utilize those elements consistent with
Whitley’s (1999) framework. Accordingly, I use five independent variables to assess
Whitley’s national business system. Four of these indicators {capital availability, the skill
development system, property rights protection, and the regulatory ease of creating new
ventures) come from the National Expert Survey. The final indicator, control o f
corruption, is drawn from the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey.

World Bank Data on income deciles in order to approximate the dividing dollar amount between categories
in each country. To construct a sample around income level, one income grouping (e.g. high, medium, or
low) in each country had to be excluded from the analysis in order to assure that there was no income
overlap between the high and low group variable that I constructed for the sample.
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Financial capital availability for new ventures, the degree to which the skill
development system focuses on entrepreneurship, lack o f regulatory complexity of
launching new ventures, and the property rights security of entrepreneurs are all
measured as the average of several scores (five-point Likert scale) from the National
Expert Survey. Survey questions in that survey are based on five-point Likert scale. On
the 2010 NES there are six questions measuring capital availability, six examining the
skill development system, seven measuring, and five that investigate property rights.
Questions measuring capital availability capture entrepreneurs’ access to funding
and private equity (Reynolds et al., 2005; Bowen & De Clercq, 2007). Questions
assessing the skill development system survey experts regarding the degree and
effectiveness to which each country's higher educational system targets entrepreneurship.
Questions examining the ease of getting business licenses, the way in which the tax
system treats new ventures, and the helpfulness of government policy in helping
entrepreneurs start new ventures are captured by regulatory ease. Finally, questions
assessing the degree to which intellectual property rights, patents, and trademarks were
protected were used to capture property rights protection.
I use the World Economic Forum’s average of nine questions (using a seven-point
Likert scale) that investigate the degree to which both public officials and other economic
actors exhibit corrupt business practices (to measure Whitley’s (1999) final dimension:
control o f corruption. The index measures how corrupt a country’s public and private
sector are perceived to be by business leaders in that country. Survey items used to
formulate each of the five constructs representing the national business system are listed
in Table 4.1.
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[INSERT TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
GDP (ppp) per capita was taken from the World Bank. This is because past work
has identified a structural relationship between an economy’s level of development and
its key entrepreneurship rates (Wennekers, Wennekers, Thurik, & Reynolds, 2005).
Similarly, there is a complex relationship between growth and new venture activity
(Wennekers et al., 2005). It is very likely that growth in GDP can pull entrepreneurial
intentions, particularly over a short period of time. If an economy is booming,
individuals, who would not otherwise decide to pursue entrepreneurship, will. Thus, GDP
growth was also used as an important control. As a final macroeconomic control, I
calculated the interaction between (low) income level and GDP per capita. Being low
income in more wealthy countries may provide a more easily accessible market for low
income entrepreneurship. There may also be other structural constraints and enablers
outside the national business system that systematically impact entrepreneurial
intentions. Due to the highly significant impact that wealth effects have on economic
activity (Wennekers et. al., 2005), the GDP per capita, individual level income
interaction term allowed me to control for many of these effects. The means, standard
deviation, and correlations of the individual and country level variables included in the
study are displayed in Table 4.2.
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
Analysis Technique
To test the above hypotheses, I use Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling
(HGLM) with robust standard errors. HGLM is appropriate for research designs where
the data for participants is organized at more than one level and the dependent variable
displays a binomial distribution. HGLM models can decompose and analyze the variance
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in the dependent variable that occurs both between groups and within each group.
Distinguishing within and between group variation can provide analysis of which level
most of the variation in the dependent variable comes from: individual or country.
Additionally, it is possible to interact individual and group level variable to ascertain
those effects. At a conceptual level, HGLM first analyzes separate regression equations
within units and summarizes them with intercepts and slopes. In step two, HGLM uses
the intercepts and slopes of the within unit relationships as an outcome variables and
regresses them on level II characteristics. So the within group average is regressed on the
level II variables (Hoffmann, 1997). Finally, HGLM uses the logit function to predict the
outcome of a categorical dependent variable based on the predictor variables. As such
HGLM is the most appropriate technique for testing the hypotheses.
4.5 RESULTS
Results of the analyses suggest that elements of the national business system
impact entrepreneurial intentions differently for high and low income individuals. In the
interests of establishing a baseline for comparison across models, I first review the results
of the Null Model and Model 1 before proceeding to a presentation of the results for my
hypotheses tests. Examination of the Null Model indicated that multilevel modeling
approach is appropriate for this data. Further, 75.1% of variation in entrepreneurial
intentions occurs at the individual level while 24.9% of variation occurs at Level 2. The
remaining three two-level HGLM models with robust standard are presented in Table 4.3.
[INSERT TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
Model 1, the Control Model, significantly improved the level of variance
explained. In line with past work, age, being male, having a high school degree, having a
college degree, and lower country-level GDP per capita (PPP) all increased the
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likelihood that an individual will choose entrepreneurship. Household size, employment
status, having a graduate degree, country GDP growth rate, and the GDP per capitaindividual income (reverse coded) interaction were all not significant. Individual level
income was only significant at the 10% level with higher income individuals more likely
to become entrepreneurs within each country.
Model 2 in Table 4.3 tests the main effect hypotheses for dimensions within the
national business system surrounding the entrepreneur. Results of that analysis indicate
that only the relationship between regulatory ease and entrepreneurial intentions was
significant at the p < 0.05 level. However, there were no significant relationships among
the other four elements o f the national business system. Hypothesis lc was supported,
while hypotheses la, lb, Id, and le were not supported. Thus, it appears that for the
general population, the notion that the national business system matters for individuals’
entrepreneurial intentions is largely unsubstantiated.
Model 3 present the results for Hypotheses 2a-2e, the contingency effect of
individual income. In contrast to hypotheses for the effects of the national business
system in general, results for these hypotheses were largely supported. Results indicate
that four of the five institutional-income level interactions were highly significant in the
predicted direction. The relationship of capital availability for entrepreneurs, regulatory
ease for venture creation, property rights protections for entrepreneurs, and control o f
corruption with entrepreneurial intentions were all positively moderated by income level
(reverse coded). That is, these four elements of the national business system are more
important for the entrepreneurial intentions of low income individuals than for wealthy
individuals. Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of the skill development system’s focus on
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entrepreneurship on entrepreneurial intentions (H2b) had a significantly stronger impact
among high income individuals than low income individuals. As I discuss below, this is
likely because most countries’ skill development systems, particularly post-secondary
education, disproportionately serve the wealthy.
Overall, Hypothesis 1, which argued for direct effects between institutions and
entrepreneurial intentions received little empirical support by our multi-country data,
while Hypothesis 2, which argued for the moderating effect of individual income was
generally supported. Below, I discuss the ramifications of these findings. Graphs of the
individual institutions-income interactions are depicted in Figures 4.2-4.6. Note that in all
cases but the skill development system-income interaction, the relationship between
institutions and entrepreneurship is stronger for low income individuals.
[INSERT FIGURES 4.2-4.6 ABOUT HERE]
4.6

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This study sheds light on the importance of market logics, as expressed through
the national business system, for the entrepreneurial intentions of individuals with low
income. While the findings do not support the notion that the national business system
has a strong direct impact on entrepreneurial intentions, it largely does have an impact on
the future intentions of low income individuals. Specifically, Model 2 indicates that if
policy-makers are seeking to simply increase the rate of entrepreneurial activity in a
country for the entire population, their emphasis should be on simplifying regulations and
lowering the tax burden on new businesses. However, the implications of Model 3 are
more profound and speak to the variation in impact that institutions have within countries.
Implications fall under three major categories: institutional logics, entrepreneurship, and
poverty.
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Contribution to the Institutional Logics Literature
The finding that agents differ in their responses to institutional forces according to
income level supports the institutional logics perspective. According to Thornton and
Ocasio (2008) cross-level effects between the institutional and individual level are critical
because actors and institutions interact and influence one another. Given this metatheoretical framework, it is important to account for the characteristics and situations that
account for deviation from expected behaviors and practices when under a given
institutional regime. By doing so, this study supports the overall institutional logics
framework.
Particularly, results support the notion of embedded agency as a more accurate
view than pure agency from neoclassical economics and pure embeddedness from
disciplines like anthropology and history. In societies where family, the community, and
tradition are strongly entrenched, I expect that the creation of new social structures (i.e.
entrepreneurship), while real, is more challenging and novel. Such behaviors are not
rooted in dominant institutional logics, and, at times, these behaviors even run counter to
them. Given the impact that counter-institutional behavior can have (e.g. Schumpeter,
1934), it is important to understand the individual characteristics responsible for behavior
that deviates from those logics. This study begins to fill this gap by fleshing out details
with regards to individual level income.
The fact that personal resources and social position determine the extent of
institutional logics’ influence is very much in line with expectations one would have
using the work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu on fields. According to Bourdieu different
individuals embedded in the same institutional/social field act differently in response to
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the same institutional forces. Variation in these responses is caused by both their social
position (whether viewed hierarchically or relationally) within the institutional/social
field as well as their ability to access resources in the field (Bourdieu, 1988).
Results are further in line with Battilana’s (2006) examination of how individuals’
ability and willingness to conduct institutional entrepreneurship within organizations.
Battilana’s piece represents a growing stream of literature that uses an institutional logics
perspective to examine how and why institutional change arises. However, researchers
should not be limited in applying the institutional logics perspective only to entrepreneurs
seeking to transform the rules of the game. Institutional logics are appropriate any time
individuals act in ways that run counter to prevalent institutional logics. Consequently,
when individuals attempt to launch new scalable ventures in regions where subsistence
activities are the norm, they are, in effect, moving the meter on the institutional climate.
By applying the institutional logics perspective to “run-of-the mill” new venture creation,
my study helps to expand the use of the institutional logics perspective in
entrepreneurship scholarship.
Contribution to the Entrepreneurship Literature
Indeed, the notion of embedded agency fits quite well with extant theory and
empirical findings regarding entrepreneurship (Garud & Kamoe, 2003). Entrepreneurship
scholars argue that there are both a supply (individual) and a demand (contextual) side to
entrepreneurship (e.g. Eckhardt & Shane, 2003). This idea echoes Shane and
Venkataraman’s (2000) seminal piece that viewed entrepreneurship as the intersection of
agents’ entrepreneurial actions and objective opportunities existing in the market and
institutional environments. Sarason, Dean and Dillard (2006:286) explain, entrepreneurs
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are “reflexive agents engaging in purposeful action. Sources of opportunities are extant
features that provide the context for creating entrepreneurial ventures. The act of
entrepreneurship occurs as the agent specifies, interprets, and acts upon the sources of
opportunity. This is a dynamic process whereby the sources of opportunity are acted on
by the agent, and the agent is affected by the sources of opportunity.” Thus the linkages
between a vibrant institutional environment and an actor with important characteristics
are both vital for new venture activity (Thornton, 1999). By arguing from an institutional
logics perspective that broader societal institutions matter but that their impact is subject
to individual characteristics, my study grounds itself deeply in the entrepreneurship
literature which has suggested balance in explaining the individual-opportunity nexus
(Shane, 2000).
Contribution toward Global Poverty Scholarship and Policy
Finally, this study aids in understanding the nature and effects of poverty. Results
indicate that a lack of individual level resources constrain agency in a very real sense.
Societal level institutions are more important for the poor than the wealthy in shaping
goals and aspirations. Such a framework echoes Amartya Sen’s (1983; 1985) Nobel Prize
winning notion of poverty as the absence of positive individual capabilities. For Sen,
capabilities rather than purchasing power or economic utility are the true measures of
poverty and wellbeing (Sen, 1993). Sen argues that in considering poverty, the ability to
achieve a certain level of utility or “functioning” should be weighed heavily (Sen, 1985).
My findings resonate with these ideas. Poor institutions, it seems, exacerbate
poverty and deny the poor the ability to achieve for themselves. That is, they diminish
capacity for change among the poor. The poor are more constrained (i.e. less free) than
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wealthier individuals due to dominant institutional logics. When policymakers seek to
address global poverty, they need to understand that examining the societal impact of
institutions is not enough. Poor institutions have a disproportionate negative impact on
low-income individuals and policy aimed at shoring up elements of the national business
system with respect to entrepreneurship must take this into account.
Explanations for Non-Findings
Four of the five hypotheses examining the direct effects of general institutional
context on entrepreneurial intentions were unsupported. This is inconsistent with theory
that suggests that institutions, particularly those aimed at entrepreneurship, should have a
strong impact on people’s intentions to launch new ventures. While surprising, there are a
few things that should be noted. First, the broad range of individual level variables that I
controlled for, goes beyond most past work. By controlling for individuals’ age, sex,
employment status, household size, education level, many of the traits that past studies
have ignored (particularly employment and household size) are controlled for. Thus, my
findings lean towards an individual rather than institutional explanation for
entrepreneurial intentions.
Another reason that only one strong direct linkage between the national business
system and entrepreneurial intentions was found is likely because of the need to control
for the impact of GDP per capita and growth. Institutional work indicates that both GDP
and growth as well as entrepreneurial phenomena are determined by institutions
(Wennekers et al., 2005). While GDP and growth are used in most studies as important
controls that have systematic structural effects on entrepreneurship by themselves, their
presence as independent variables can certainly be sources of type 2 errors with respect to
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institutions. Unfortunately, few instruments for these important variables are available.
Regressing entrepreneurial intentions on the institutional variables without these controls
yielded significant results. In cross-country studies, however, one must balance concerns
for endogeneity between macro-level variables and institutional components against the
need to control for the structural effects that income and growth levels may have on the
relationship of interest. In this case, I deemed type 1 error a more major concern than
type 2 error, choosing to err on the side of controls.
The second unforeseen finding perhaps should not have come as a surprise. The
skill development system-income interaction had the opposite relationship with
opportunity entrepreneurship that I expected. Instead of weak skill development
institutions having a disproportionately strong impact on low income individuals, results
indicated the exact opposite. Higher income and a skill development system aimed at
entrepreneurship appear to serve as complements with respect to entrepreneurial
intentions. My interpretation of this finding is that wealthier individuals are in better
position to take advantage of the upper echelons of the skill development systems, which
make up several items in the construct. More so than the other elements of the national
business system, the financial system, even in countries where it is strong, is very
unequally distributed.
Limitations and Future Research
The use of more exact individual income data would also improve the research
design. The variable for income is a dichotomous variable partitioned at 2010 world
mean GDP. A clearer picture of individual income’s impact on entrepreneurial intentions
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and its interaction with the institutional environment could be presented with more fine
grained data.
Second, my data is a cross-sectional analysis. Future research could examine the
impact of institutional change on the same individuals over time. Such a research design
would greatly increase confidence in the implications of this study. If changes in
institutions and income were shown to increase entrepreneurial intentions, policymakers
could be far more confident in developing remedies. Moreover, future research that could
examine individuals over time could gather income data before entrepreneurial activity
takes place but then measure more kinetic entrepreneurial outcomes than intentions as the
dependent variable. Such a program of study would significantly improve upon this one.
Third, while institutional data are gathered at the country level, this is not always
the way in which institutions manifest their effects. As Stenholm et al., (2013: 190) notes,
“an increasing amount economic development is ‘spiky,’ concentrating in particular
geographic regions and often without regard to borders.” Within, countries as large as
China and India there is significant variation in the strength of market logics. In places
such as Beijing and Mumbai, these logics are quite strong. Yet in Calcutta and regions of
western China, they are quite weak. While these measures are not systematically skewed
(i.e. biased) for the individuals within each country, geography may improve the
reliability of their application to each individual in the sample.
O f course such nuance is in keeping with the overall framework of this paper:
institutions within countries do not impact all individuals evenly. Future research could
take the idea that the institutional framework has uneven effects and apply that to other
meaningful individual characteristics. For instance, individuals that are in the majority
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racial group may need increased institutional protection in order to act entrepreneurially.
Individuals who live in urban settings may not be as well insulated from novel ideas and
institutions as individuals from rural settings. From a practical policymaking point of
view, it would be very interesting to see if internet use mitigates or circumvents
institutions’ impact on entrepreneurship.
Conclusions
Despite these limitations, this study provides rigorous and relevant empirical
insights into how national institutions influence entrepreneurial intentions. This study
sheds light on the importance of market logics, as expressed through the national business
system, for the entrepreneurial intentions of individuals with low income. Results of the
analyses suggest that elements of the national business system impact entrepreneurial
intentions differently for high and low income individuals. Findings expand knowledge
about the role of embedded agency within society by highlighting a key variable in
determining when individuals will deviate from dominant institutional logics.
Furthermore, by interacting individual income with institutional profile, findings add
nuance to knowledge on the individual characteristics associated with entrepreneurship
participation. Finally, results buttress understanding of the nature of poverty and its
impact on individuals’ ability to act as autonomous economic agents.
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Table 4.1: Survey Items for the National Business System
Questions from GEM's Expert Questionnaire
C apital Availability (targeted at entrepreneurship)
In m y c o
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

u n try :
T h e re
T h e re
T h e re
T h e re
T h e re
T h e re

is s u f f ic ie n t e q u ity f u n d in g a v a ila b le f o r n e w a n d g r o w in g firm s .
is s u f f ic ie n t d e b t f u n d in g a v a ila b le f o r n e w a n d g ro w in g firm s .
a re s u ffic ie n t g o v e rn m e n t s u b s id ie s a v a ila b le fo r n e w a n d g ro w in g firm s .
is s u f f ic ie n t f u n d in g a v a ila b le f r o m p r iv a te in d iv id u a ls ( o th e r th a n f o u n d e r s ) f o r n e w a n d g r o w in g firm s .
is s u f f ic ie n t v e n tu r e c a p ita lis t f u n d in g a v a ila b le f o r n e w a n d g r o w in g fir m s .
is s u f f ic ie n t f u n d in g a v a ila b le th r o u g h in itia l p u b lic o ff e r in g s ( I P O s ) f o r n e w a n d g r o w in g f ir m s

Skill Development System (targeted at entrepreneurship)
In m y c o
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

u n try :
G o v e rn m e n t p o lic ie s
T h e su p p o rt fo r n e w
T h e su p p o rt fo r n e w
N e w firm s c a n g e t m
T h e a m o u n t o f ta x e s
T a x e s a n d o th e r g o v

(e .g . p u b lic p ro c u r e m e n t) c o n s is te n tly f a v o r n e w f irm s .
a n d g r o w in g fir m s is a h ig h p rio r ity f o r p o lic y a t th e n a tio n a l g o v e r n m e n t le v e l.
a n d g ro w in g firm s is a h ig h p rio rity fo r p o lic y a t th e lo c a l g o v e rn m e n t le v e l.
o s t o f th e r e q u ir e d p e r m its a n d lic e n s e s in a b o u t a w e e k .
is N O T a b u rd e n fo r n e w a n d g ro w in g firm s .
e r n m e n t r e g u la tio n s a r e a p p lie d to n e w a n d g ro w in g f ir m s in a p r e d ic ta b le a n d c o n s is te n t w a y .

Regulatory Ease of Creating New Ventures
In m y co
1.
2.
3.
4.

u n try :
G o v e r n m e n t p ro g ra m s a im e d a t s u p p o r tin g n e w a n d g ro w in g firm s a re e f f e c tiv e .
T e a c h in g in p rim a ry a n d s e c o n d a iy e d u c a tio n e n c o u ra g e s c re a tiv ity , s e lf-s u ffic ie n c y , a n d p e rs o n a l in itia tiv e .
T e a c h in g in p rim a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y e d u c a tio n p ro v id e s a d e q u a te in s tr u c tio n in m a r k e t e c o n o m ic p rin c ip le s .
T e a c h in g in p r im a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y e d u c a tio n p ro v id e s a d e q u a te a tte n tio n to e n tr e p r e n e u r s h ip a n d n e w firm
c re a tio n .

5.

Colleges and universities provide good and adequate preparation for starting up and grow ing new firms.

6.

T h e le v e l o f b u s in e s s a n d m a n a g e m e n t e d u c a tio n p ro v id e g o o d a n d a d e q u a te p re p a ra tio n fo r
n e w firm s .

s ta rtin g u p a n d g ro w in g

Property Rights Protection
In my country:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

T
T
T
N

h e in te lle c tu a l p ro p e r ty r ig h ts ( I P R ) le g is la tio n is c o m p r e h e n s iv e .
h e in te lle c tu a l p ro p e r ty r ig h ts (I P R ) le g is la tio n is e f f ic ie n tly e n fo r c e d .
h e ille g a l s a le o f " p ir a te d " s o f tw a r e , v id e o s , C D s , a n d o th e r c o p y r ig h te d o r tr a d e m a r k e d p r o d u c ts is n o t e x te n s iv e .
e w a n d g ro w in g firm s c a n tru s t th a t th e ir p a te n ts , c o p y rig h ts , a n d tra d e m a rk s w ill
b e re s p e c te d .
I t is w id e ly r e c o g n iz e d th a t in v e n to rs " r ig h ts f o r th e ir in v e n tio n s s h o u ld b e re s p e c te d .

Questions from W EF Executive Opinion Survey
Control of C orruption
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

T h e c o r p o r a te e th ic s ( e th ic a l b e h a v io r in in te r a c tio n s w ith p u b lic o ff ic ia ls , p o litic ia n s , a n d o th e r e n te r p r is e s ) o f m y
c o u n t r y 's f i r m s i n m y i n d u s t r y a r e a m o n g t h e w o r l d 's w o r s t ( b e s t ) .
G o v e r n m e n t s u b s id ie s to b u s in e s s in m y c o u n tr y k e e p u n c o m p e titiv e in d u s tr ie s a liv e a r tif ic ia lly ( im p r o v e th e
p ro d u c tiv ity o f in d u s tr ie s ) .
W h e n d e c id in g u p o n p o lic ie s a n d c o n tra c ts , g o v e r n m e n t o ff ic ia ls u s u a lly f a v o r w e ll- c o n n e c te d firm s a n d in d iv id u a ls
(a re n e u tra l a m o n g firm s a n d in d iv id u a ls ).
H o w c o m m o n ly d o f ir m s in m y in d u s tr y g iv e ir r e g u la r e x tr a p a y m e n ts o r b r ib e s c o n n e c te d w ith im p o r t a n d e x p o r t
p e rm its ? C o m m o n (N e v e r).
H o w c o m m o n ly d o firm s in m y in d u s tr y g iv e ir r e g u la r e x tr a p a y m e n ts o r b rib e s w h e n g e ttin g c o n n e c te d to p u b lic
u tilitie s ? C o m m o n (N e v e r).
H o w c o m m o n ly d o fir m s in m y in d u s tr y g iv e ir r e g u la r e x tr a p a y m e n ts o r b rib e s c o n n e c te d w ith a n n u a l ta x
p a y m e n ts ? C o m m o n (N e v e r).
In m y c o u n try , h o w c o m m o n ly a re p u b lic fu n d s to c o m p a n ie s , in d iv id u a ls , o r g ro u p s d iv e rte d d u e to c o rru p tio n ?
C o m m o n (N e v e r).
P u b lic tr u s t in th e h o n e s ty o f p o litic ia n s is v e r y lo w ( v e r y h ig h ).
D o u n f a ir o r c o r r u p t a c tiv itie s o f o th e r firm s im p o s e c o s ts o n m y f ir m ? I m p o s e la r g e c o s ts ( I m p o s e n o c o s ts /n o t
re le v a n t).

Figure 4.1: Market Logics, Poverty, and Entrepreneurial Intentions
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Table 4.2: Variable Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix, n=49,013
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Table 4.3: HLM Results for Entrepreneurial Intentions

Control Variables
Age
Female
Household Size
Employed
High School Degree
College Degree
Graduate Degree
GDP Growth Rate
GDP per Capita (thousands)
Income (reverse-coded)*
GDP per Capita X Income*
Main Effects
Capital Availability
Skill Development System
Lack of Regulatory Burden
Property Rights
Control of Corruption

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

B

S.E.

B

S.E.

B

S.E.

-0.02**
-0.41**
0.002
0.04
0.12**
0.09**
0.08
0.02
-0.06**
-0.26
-0.01

0.001
0.02
0.002
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.16
0.03

-0.02**
-0.41**
0.002
0.04
0.12*
0.09*
0.08
0.03
0.05**
-0.22
-0.0002

0.002
0.05
0.002
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.12
0.001

-0.02**
-0.41**
0.002
0.04
0.12*
0.10*
0.08
0.03
0.05**
-0.04
-0.0002

0.002
0.05
0.002
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.07
0.001

-0.25
0.61
0.42*
-0.69
0.15

0.27
0.41
0.21
0.39
0.16

-0.25
0.61
0.42*
-0.69
0.15

0.27
0.41
0.21
0.39
0.16

0.51**
-1.23**
0.79**
0.33**
0.22**

0.03
0.16
0.07
0.10
0.07**

Interaction Effects

Capital Availability X Income*
Skill Development X Income*
Regulatory Ease X Income*
Property Rights X Income*
Control of Corruption X Income*

Deviance (-2 log likelihood)
132,360
132,801
135,061
Deviance Difference (Chi-square)
6,804**
6,363**
4,103**
Individual-level n = 49,013; country-level n = 48. Unstandardized regression coefficients and robust
standard errors reported.
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01
± = reverse coded.
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Figure 4.2: Capital Availability-Income Interaction
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Figure 4.3: Skill Development System-Income Interaction
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Figure 4.4: Regulatory Ease-Income Interaction
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Figure 4.5: Property Rights-Income Interaction
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Figure 4.6: Control of Corruption-Income Interaction
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CHAPTER 5
5. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I wish to briefly recount the contributions that each of my three
essays make. Each of the three essays took a slightly different approach to exploring the
institutions-entrepreneurship relationship and how that relationship relates to poverty and
development in low income countries. Essay I examined solutions that organizations can
offer to weak informal institutions. Essay II examined countries’ institutional profiles as
complex gestalts and detailed how even lower income countries can create opportunity
entrepreneurship. Essay III explored the income-institutions-entrepreneurship nexus, and
described how poor institutions and low income negatively reinforce one another,
resulting in a poverty trap. Below I briefly summarize the contributions of each of these
three essays.
Essay I explored how a lack of expert venture scripts within societies constitutes
an institutional void and how those voids might be addressed by entrepreneurshipenabling organizations (EEOs). It further proposed a network-based means by which
EEOs provides expert venture scripts to increase venture quality in subsistence
economies. By doing so, EEOs play a key role in the institutionalization of important
entrepreneurial cognitions.
I theorized that for EEOs to thrive and achieve their objectives, the proper social
dimensions, social bridges and local embeddedness, must be in place. Accordingly, Essay
I contribute to the literature on the establishment of proto-institutions in contexts where
regulated market-based economic transactions are counter-institutional. The cases of
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Milma and Dastkar provide important examples of how entrepreneurship-enabling
organizations have been able to implement the model I propose in such contexts.
Indeed, subsistence markets are chronically sub-optimal spaces for the
development of opportunity entrepreneurship. In these settings different institutions may
compete for the allegiance of or dominance over the reigning social order. Deterministic
paradigms like institutional economics, which generally explores the linkages between
faulty (and good) formal institutions and economic activity (e.g. La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997) does not explain how markets can emerge in nonconducive equilibria, although such emergence is a historical reality. I argue as an
alternative that EEOs must attempt to institutionalize the informal institutions conducive
to the development of new ventures. Essay I, therefore, contributes to the literature on the
establishment of new informal institutions in contexts where market-based economic
transactions are counter-institutional.
One key area where my model has wide application to current development
practices, namely microfinance, is that venture scripts aid in the evaluation of the quality
of new ventures. Organizations that do not provide entrepreneurial expertise may
engender “false positive” creation decisions, leaving individuals in deep debt with no
viable business and jeopardizing their family’s wellbeing when they are already living
hand to mouth. A failed business venture will threaten their existence because there are
no safety nets to rely upon if the venture goes bad.
Unfortunately, many microfinance institutions provide few if any venture scripts.
My model suggests that EEOs that do not provide access to new markets or information,
and who are not deeply involved with nascent entrepreneurs as they implement their new
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venture will fond ventures of low quality. Many microfinance institutions evaluate, on
some level, the business plans submitted for potential loans. But they do not help improve
them or guide the entrepreneur as he tries to exploit it without the proper knowledge, and
they certainly do not institutionalize entrepreneurial expertise. Consequently, many fail
because the individuals receiving the loans are simply not prepared to be entrepreneurs.
As an alternative, organizations that improve individuals’ ability to found and run
successful businesses promote self-determination and foster a sense of accomplishment
lacking in many other poverty alleviation strategies. EEOs can enhance the capabilities of
the poor by giving them access to both general business and specialized venture specific
knowledge, improving their ability to learn about productive enterprises by exposing
them to new scientific and organizational concepts, fostering the ability to innovate via
this same exposure, increasing their incentives to develop more human capital, and
removing prohibitive transaction costs by forging cooperative relationships in a
hierarchal organization (Smith & Pezeshkan, 2013).
In Essay II, I hypothesized that the national business system (Whitley, 1999)
combines with entrepreneurial culture in equifinal ways to lead to high growth
opportunity entrepreneurship. The central finding that emerged is that there are multiple
and equifinal institutional combinations that are associated with high levels of
opportunity entrepreneurship at a societal level. Further, empirical support for the Core
Proposition indicate that none of the institutional components are sufficient by
themselves for opportunity entrepreneurship. Instead, institutions combine to form multicomponent gestalts.

A primary contribution of Essay II is the notion of equifinality of three different
sufficient institutional bundles for opportunity entrepreneurship. That is there are at least
three different institutional pathways for achieving high levels of opportunity
entrepreneurship. This is an argument consistent with, for instance, the varieties of
capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001), that argues that there is more than one path
to economic competitiveness. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the “Washington
Consensus” has more or less argued that good governance with regards to government
policy, only one of Whitley’s four elements, is key to transformative economic activity.
However, my results imply that the “Washington Consensus” is not the only path and,
indeed, may not be appropriate given the status of the society’s entrepreneurial culture
and other elements of the national business system (particularly the skill development
system and trust relations) within a country. In fact, it seems likely that the “Washington
Consensus” can be very successful in some places but not others. My approach, in
contrast, encourages policymakers to take a step back and recognize the strengths and
weaknesses of their economy and, given these strengths and weaknesses, to determine
how best to accomplish key outcomes, like opportunity entrepreneurship.
Further, my approach in Essay II argues that institutions bundle together rather
than focusing on fixing one institution or type of institution. As scholars and
policymakers view institutions as holistic bundles, better and more targeted institutional
prescriptions can emerge. This approach allows policymakers to view existing
institutional profiles as laboratories for mixing ingredients together in order to increase
opportunity entrepreneurship. Even the successes of smaller countries may provide
valuable insights about institutional synergies that may work elsewhere.
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In this way, Essay II findings agree with recent work in development studies on
institutional stickiness (i.e. Williamson, 2009). Institutional stickiness is the notion
conceptualizing the speed at which institutional change can unfold in a society. This
concept is particularly important for the enactment of new regulative elements because
they are relatively easy to alter, yet may not receive broad public support or buy-in.
Consequently, in societies in which culture is ill-conducive to entrepreneurship, elements
of the national business system will not stick. This indicates that scholars focusing on
only one aspect of institutions independent of the others may miss the big picture. In this
vein La Porta et al (1998) observed that common law, arising endogenously, was far
more effective that legislated civil law. This occurs because endogenously emergent
institutions avoid many undesirable consequences that plague inorganic imposed
solutions. Despite the problems with isolating institutional elements due to the fact that
they shape one another over time, past work on institutions and entrepreneurship has
taken exactly that approach. Hopefully, my findings encourage scholars to start viewing
institutions in bundles instead. Future research should focus on the complementariness or
substitutability of institutions.
While Essay II provides evidence that the effect of the national business system’s
components are contingent on the other components as well as entrepreneurial culture,
Essay III provides evidence that the effects of these components are contingent on
individual level income. Essay III highlights that individual income level interacts with
elements of the national business system to determine entrepreneurial intentions. The
finding that agents differ in their responses to institutional forces according to income
level supports the institutional logics perspective. According to Thornton and Ocasio
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(2008) cross-level effects between the institutional and individual level are critical
because actors and institutions interact and influence one another. Given this metatheoretical framework, it is important to account for the characteristics and situations that
account for deviation from expected behaviors and practices when under a given
institutional regime. By doing so, this study supports the overall institutional logics
framework.
Overall, results support one of the Institutional Logics Perspective’s central
tenets: embedded agency. Individuals are not purely atomistic agents with perfect free
will but neither are their actions completely determined by institutional forces. An apt
analogy is that of individuals being like sailboats. The prevailing winds of institutional
logics have a strong impact on the course of behavior. One can either go with the winds
of dominant institutional logics or fight against them. How individuals adjust their own
sails, however, is up to them. Consequently, in societies where the prevailing winds of
family, the community, and tradition blow strongly, going against them through the
creation of new social structures (i.e. entrepreneurship), while real, is more challenging
and novel. Such a course is not being pushed by prevailing institutional logic. Indeed at
times, these behaviors even run counter to them.
Given the history-shaping impact that counter-institutional behavior (e.g.
entrepreneurship in places that are not entrepreneurial) can have it is important to
understand the individual characteristics responsible for behavior that deviates from those
logics. Such behaviors can help alter the prevailing winds within pockets of societies, as
the model and cases of Milma and Dastkar detail in Essay I. They can produce new and
beneficial winds associated with creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934). Unfortunately,
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as Essay III details, those who need the prevailing winds to change most, low income
individuals, are least capable of fighting against them. The biggest contribution of Essay
III, therefore, is in fleshing out details with regards to individual income.
In fact there is a growing stream of literature that uses the institutional logics
perspective to examine institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. Battilana, 2006). Findings and
implications of Essay III imply, however, that researchers should not be limited in
applying the institutional logics perspective only to institutional entrepreneurs seeking to
directly transform the rules of the game. Instead, the perspective is appropriate any time
individuals act in ways that run counter to prevalent institutional logics. So, for instance,
when individuals or organizations, attempt to launch new ventures in subsistence
markets, they are in actuality altering the institutional climate. Milma and Dastkar, in
Essay 1 do exactly that. By applying the institutional logics perspective to every day
entrepreneurship in contexts where it is not normative, Essay III helps to expand the use
of the institutional logics perspective to areas of entrepreneurship besides institutional
entrepreneurship proper.
Essay III also enhances the discussion on entrepreneurship and development by
shedding additional light on the nature and effects of poverty. Results indicate that a lack
of individual level resources constrain agency. Lack of agency implies lack of freedom
and lack of capabilities. These ideas echo and perhaps enhance famed economist
Amartya Sen’s assertion that at the root of poverty is the absence of positive individual
capabilities. For Sen, it is capabilities and not consumption that is the true measure of
poverty and wellbeing (Sen, 1985). Results in Essay III indicate that poor institutions
constrain lower income individuals in ways that they do not constrain wealthier
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individuals. They reduce capacity for change among the poor. Therefore, policymakers
need to understand that examining the net societal impact of institutions may not always
be enough. Poor institutions have a disproportionate negative impact on low-income
individuals.
Overall, this dissertation offers some new theoretical insights to the literature
exploring the complex relationships between institutions and entrepreneurship. This
relationship, as all three essays attest, is not linear and straight forward. And there is
plenty of space for individuals and organizations to act and foster meaningful opportunity
entrepreneurship. As such, I hope that this dissertation spurs new and better research
examining these very important issues.
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